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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Atsuo Hirano for the Master of 
Arts in History presented February 14, 1996. 
Title: The Japanese Approach to the End of the Pacific War. 
Before World War II ended with the Japanese surrender 
to the Allied Nations on August 15, 1945, the United States 
dropped the atomic bomb on a Japanese city of Hiroshima. 
For fifty years, the question of whether the atomic bomb was 
necessary to end the war has been discussed by historians 
and journalists. 
The purpose of this thesis is to clarify the Japanese 
situation in the spring and summer of 1945 by reading the 
statements and ideas of the Japanese Emperor, government 
officials and military officers at the time. 
Since the Japanese Emperor was believed to have played 
a significant role in ending the war, it is necessary to 
examine his power and the nature of his decision making. 
Also, the Japanese Army still wielded significant 
2 
influence on the Japanese government, it is indispensable to 
examine what the Army men thought and said at the time. 
In the final stage of the war, the Japanese leadership 
came to realize that the retention of the Imperial System 
would be the only demand from the Allied Nations they could 
insist on. The American leadership knew this circumstance 
in Japan, and thought that the war could be ended by giving 
the Japanese the assurance of retaining the Emperor. 
After the May 8th German surrender, the Japanese feared 
the Soviet entry into the war against Japan. They knew that 
Japan could not fight against all the world. Also, the 
Japanese feared the spread of communism through Soviet 
advance toward Japan. So the Japanese asked for the Soviet 
maintenance of neutrality and mediation in the war. Even 
when the Japanese were asking for the Soviet mediation, they 
had the alternative plan of asking for the direct 
negotiation with the United States in case the Soviet route 
was to be closed. 
Through considering all these factors, it is concluded 
that in the summer of 1945 the Japanese were unable to 
continue the war and were seeking a way to end the war. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From the autumn of 1994 to the spring of 1995, the 
exhibition of the historical artifacts of the atomic bombing 
of Hiroshima at the Smithonian Institute in Washington D.C. 
became controversial in America. Among the several points 
in the dispute, the opponents of the exhibition pointed out 
that the original guidebook favored the Japanese side too 
much in the explanation of the Japanese war situation, 
depicting the Japanese as victims and the Americans as 
attackers. On the whole, the argument of each side did not 
necessarily clarify the Japanese situation at that time. 
Also, in the summer of 1995, around the time of the 
50th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing, major American TV 
networks broadcast documentary and discussion programs 
concerning the atomic bombing on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It 
opened a wide debate on the question of whether or not the 
atomic bombing was necessary to end the war with Japan. 
During the debates, the participants in the programs voiced 
rather stereotyped views of the Japanese in the spring and 
summer of 1945. 
The purpose of my thesis is to clarify the Japanese 
situation before the end of World War II by looking at some 
Japanese sources to contribute to the discussion of whether 
or not the atomic bomb was necessary to end the war in the 
Pacific and Asia. 
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Since the Japanese Emperor was the central figure in 
the process of ending the war, it is necessary to clarify 
the background and nature of his involvement in the war, and 
to ask the question of why he continued the war. Until his 
death in 1989, the Emperor Hirohito was a mysterious person. 
Many Japanese and Americans called him like-a-God figure. 
It is necessary to get rid of this veil and study his real 
role in the war. Especially, it is crucial to see his 
relation to the Japanese Army. He did not necessarily have 
complete control of his Army before and during the war, and 
this factor contributed to his delayed decision to end the 
war. 
In America, many people still believe that the atomic 
bomb ended the war. As factors for bringing the war to its 
end, three years and nine months of severe battles in the 
Pacific island were far more important. Also, in the summer 
3 
of 1945, American air raids and naval blockade had already 
brought the Japanese war efforts to near bankruptcy. Social 
chaos from the starvation of people was imminent. 
Continuously engaging in the war was to become impossible 
due to the scarcity of materials. 
When the Japanese were suffering from devastation and 
near starvation in the war with the United States and other 
Allied nations, and the war was in the final leg in early 
August of 1945, the Soviet entry into the war was considered 
as a decisive blow to the Japanese. The Japanese Army had 
wanted to end the war by Soviet mediation without losing 
face and to end the war on favorable terms. 
Observing the def eat in Okinawa and the surrender of 
Germany, more Japanese came to realize that the defeat of 
Japan was inevitable, and that the battle on the Japanese 
homeland would bring forth tremendous disaster and chaos to 
Japan and an end to the imperial system. Contrary to the 
ostentatious cry of the Army men for the battle on the 
homeland, very poor defense conditions began to be exposed 
to the Emperor, government officials, and to the people. 
Facing the realities of the war, the morale of the people, 
as well as of many soldiers, was deteriorating. 
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In the American preparation for the Potsdam Conference, 
the article for the retention of the Emperor was deleted 
right before the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, by 
Secretary of State James Byrnes. As predicted by Secretary 
of War Stimson, the Japanese did not immediately accept it. 
After the atomic bombing and the Soviet entry into the 
Japanese war, the assurance that the Emperor would be 
retained made the Japanese finally decide to surrender. 
For bringing the war to its end, not a single factor 
was decisive, but rather many persons and many events 
gradually changed the situation in the direction to the end 
of the war by interacting and influencing each other. 
CHAPTER I 
THE EMPEROR CONTINUED THE WAR 
Emperor's War Responsibility 
The Japanese Emperor Hirohito, now called Showa Tenno, 
approved the Japanese entry into the Pacific War with the 
United States and Great Britain in November 1941. He di-
rected the war actively, and encouraged his soldiers in the 
reckless war in the Pacific, and in Asia. The Japanese 
government and military authority told the soldiers that to 
die for the Emperor was an honorable thing. Actually, about 
three million of Japanese soldiers and civilians died in the 
war, and a far greater number of people in Asia and in the 
Pacific became the victims in the war. Considering the fact 
that the Japanese fought the war in the name of the Emperor 
and many people became victims because of this, the question 
of whether the Emperor was responsible for the war sounds 
strange. However, this question has been asked for fifty 
years since the war. As Herbert P. Bix points out in his 
article, "Hiroshima in History and Memory: Japan's 
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Delayed Surrender: A Reinterpretation," the ambiguous expla-
nation of the Emperor's role in the war was caused by his 
minister's strenuous efforts to make him immune to the accu-
sation of responsibility for the war and the United States 
government's and General Douglas MacArthur's policy to use 
the Emperor for the smooth occupation of Japan. 1 
Actually, MacArthur reported to the Army Chief of Staff 
Eisenhower on January 25, 1946, that: 
No specific and tangible evidence has been uncov-
ered with regard to the emperor's exact activities 
which might connect him with the political deci-
sions of the Japanese Empire during the last de-
cade. 2 
MacArthur added to this statement that removal of the Em-
peror would create the need for "a minimum of a million 
troops ... for an indefinite number of years. " 3 These two 
statements of MacArthur's are somewhat contradictory. While 
he asserted the Emperor's innocence in the first statement, 
1Herbert P. Bix, "The Showa Emperor's 'Monologue' and 
the Problem of War Responsibility," Journal Qf Japanese 
Studies, 18(Summer 1992): 322-332; hereafter cited Bix, 
"Monologue." 
2Foreign Relations of the United States. 1946. Volume 
8. The Far East (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1971), 396; cited in Bix, "Monologue," 332. 
3 Ibid. 
he approved the opinion of the people who accused the Em-
peror of his conduct in the war even though MacArthur op-
posed the removal of the Emperor from his position. 
By clearly understanding Emperor Hirohito's role in 
7 
the war, from the beginning to the end, we will also be able 
to understand how the war came to its termination. If it 
had been Hirohito who started the war and ended the war, 
there would be no doubt that he would have been able to 
stop the war much earlier. If he really had such power, the 
next question would be what made him continue the war even 
long after Japanese def eat became likely at Saipan where 
Japanese forces were annihilated by the United States armed 
forces. 
The Start of the Pacific War 
On November 30, 1941, about a week before the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor, Hirohito's younger brother, Prince 
Takamatsu, tried to persuade his brother to avoid the war, 
saying that Hirohito could do it before the Navy started the 
offensive movement on December 1. Takamatsu added that he 
heard from the Navy staff office that the odds would be SO-
SO, or 60-40 in favor of the Japanese side. Hirohito said 
~ 
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that he was afraid that Japan might lose the war. Then 
Takamatsu asked, "Why don't you drop the decision to enter 
the war?" Hirohito answered, "The military and the govern-
ment are now moving toward the war. I have to approve what 
they have already decided. 114 In this statement of the Em-
peror's, he concealed an essential point. For important 
proposals and decisions, military leaders and government 
ministers had to consult with the Emperor beforehand. It 
was almost like their asking the Emperor's approval to the 
matters they proposed. The Emperor was able to direct the 
government's and military's policies by asking questions or 
making them reconsider their proposals. When he approved 
his ministers' proposals, he said "Yes," or "Good," and for 
the ones he did not like, he just ignored them with sheer 
silence. 5 Tojo Hideki, Prime Minister from October 18, 1941 
4Fujiwara Akira, Awaya Kentaro, Yoshida Yutaka, and 
Yamada Akira, Tettei-kensho. Showa Tenno "Dokuhakuroku" 
[Full Investigation of the Emperor's "Monologue"] (Tokyo: 
Otsuki-shoten, 1991), 67; hereafter cited Fujiwara, Tettei-
kensho. 
All translations are by the author unless otherwise 
indicated. 
5Fujiwara Akira, Yoshida Yutaka, Ito Satoru, Kunugi 
Toshihiro, Tenno no Showashi [Emperor's History of Showa 
period] (Tokyo: Shin-nihon-shuppansha, 1988), 42. 
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to July 18, 1944, has been considered as bad as Hitler and 
Mussolini in World War II. On December 31, 1947, he testi-
fied to the Tokyo War Crimes Court that "Japanese subjects 
are not supposed to do anything that the Emperor does not 
like. It is more true with the high officials in the na-
tion." American chief prosecutor Joseph Keenan was shocked 
when he heard this because this statement contradicted his 
scenario of the war criminal trial. He wanted Tojo to be 
most responsible for the war and denied any possibility of 
indicting the Emperor. Keenan advised the Emperor's minis-
ters to pressure Tojo to modify his previous statement. 
Tojo then said to the court on January 6 next year that 
"Previously he talked about his emotion as a subject to the 
Emperor, not the Emperor's war responsibility. 116 So Tojo 
was forced to assume responsibility for the war, and to 
sacrifice himself for the Emperor, and Tojo accepted it. In 
Tojo's statement quoted above, the words "supposed" and "the 
high officials" are meaningful and important indicating 
different types of men among the people of lower ranks who 
6Yoshida Yutaka, Showa Tenno no Shusenshi [Showa 
Emperor's History of Ending the War] (Tokyo: Iwanami 
Shinsho, 1992), 114. 
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might have acted quite differently from senior statesmen 
like Tojo. 
We need to see how the Emperor got involved in the 
whirlwind of the war. The Emperor appeared very happy in 
the early part of 1942 when the Japanese armed forces sue-
ceeded in their invasions in the Pacific and southern Asian 
theaters. Kido Koichi, chief adviser to the Emperor, re-
corded in his diary that on March 9, 1942, the Emperor, with 
a happy and smiling face, told Kido that the Emperor was 
amazed and pleased at the very quick victories of his army 
and navy in the Pacific and Southern Asia. 7 He mentioned to 
Kido after the fall of Singapore on February 15 that "Japa-
nese operations are succeeding this way because we prepared 
very well this time studying and discussing war strategies 
and tactic. 118 Kido added that even at this time of felic-
ity, the Emperor did not forget to instruct Kido to think 
about good timing for ending the war. 
7Kido Koichi, Kido nikki [Kido diaries], March 9, 1945 
(hereafter cited Kido), cited in Fujiwara, Tenno no 
Showashi, 85. 
8Kido, February 15, cited in Fujiwara, Tenno no 
Showashi, 85. 
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Objective of the War 
At this time the Emperor revealed his objective in this 
war saying that until the Japanese forces completely secured 
and controlled the resources in Southern Asia, the Japanese 
could not help but continue the war. 9 Kinoshita Michie, 
attendant to the Emperor, heard him say on December 11, 
1945, that Japan began and lost the war because of oil. 10 
However simplified, this statement still conveys the Em-
peror's sense of justification and the inevitability of the 
war. Here the Emperor indicated that that the well publi-
cized slogan "Co-prosperity of East Asia" was a veil to hide 
Japan's real purpose of the war. 
Emperor's and Militarists' View of the World 
To understand the close relation between the Emperor 
and the military, we need to see how the relation between 
them developed. Herbert Bix points out that the Emperor and 
Japanese militarists shared the same ideas about the world 
9Kido, February 12, cited in Fujiwara, Tenno no 
Showashi, 85. 
1°Kinoshita Michie, Sokkin Nisshi [Court Attendant's 
Diaries] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha, 1990), 72-73, in Bix, 
"Monologue", 325. 
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after World War I. They complained that Japan did not enjoy 
equality in the world. The complaints they harbored were: 
the Great Powers' pressure on Japan to reduce its armaments 
after the Washington Naval Conference in 1922; the United 
States' rejection of Japanese immigration to California and 
the whites-only policy in Australia; the abrogation of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance; the American obstruction of the 
Japanese expansion in China. 11 Even though the Emperor did 
not want the war with the United States and Great Britain 
personally, his world view became the background of his 
later acquiescence to the military adventures in the Pa-
cific. 
Contrary to the discontent of the Emperor and the mili-
tary, the Japanese people in general welcomed peace after 
World War I. In this Taisho period (1912-1925), the Impe-
rial government's control over the people was loosened, and 
political parties developed. Emperor Taisho, Hirohito's 
father, was suffering from syphilis, and his physical and 
mental conditions deteriorated. One day he caused trouble 
at an important Imperial ritual, which denigrated the au-
11Kinoshita, Sokkin-nisshi, 211-12, cited in Bix, 
"Monologue," 335. 
• 
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thority of the Emperor by disappointing the people regarding 
the personality of the Emperor. When he was expected to 
read an Imperial rescript, he began to make a telescope from 
the paper for the Imperial rescript and enjoyed the view 
from it for a while. This story spread quite widely among 
people because what they had expected from the Emperor was 
quite different. So when Hirohito became the Emperor after 
his father's death, he wanted to restore the authority of 
the Emperor. For this task, he found the military leaders 
more reliable and helpful than the politicians of the polit-
ical parties. Facing international and domestic difficul-
ties, the Emperor thought that the military men stood up 
while the politicians were corrupt. 12 
The Emperor thought that the Japanese invasion in Man-
churia was legitimate because Japan had a large population 
in a narrow land and Japan had been developing its power 
quite rapidly. So he gave ex post facto consent to the 
Japanese military's advance into Manchuria, which the Em-
peror considered as a rural area. 13 However, he was aware 
12 Ibid. 
uFujiwara, Tettei-kensho, 31. 
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that the advance of the Japanese armed forces into northern 
China would cause a clash with the United States and Great 
Britain. 14 When he approved of the further southern advance 
of the Japanese Army troops into Shanghai and Vietnam, he 
was actually leading the nation into a collision course with 
the United States and Great Britain, and the Emperor 
Hirohito should have been aware of it. 
Emperor's Strong Tie with the Military 
In the final year of the war, one of the reasons why it 
took so much time for the Emperor to depart from the Army's 
position that the Japanese should fight to the last in the 
Japanese homeland is that the Emperor was so intimately 
related to the military. It was the Emperor's military, and 
its mission was to protect the Imperial System and promote 
the well-being of the Japanese Empire. In the early Meiji 
period (1868-1912), the government designated three funda-
mental duties of the people: taxation, education, and con-
scription. In the nation building of modern Japan, all 
these three duties of the people were directed to the estab-
lishment of a strong army and navy. Here, conscription 
14 Ibid. 
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meant not just recruiting soldiers, but dedication of the 
lives of soldiers to the Emperor if necessary, and education 
meant to create and train young men and women who would be 
willing to do that. The result of the education was superb. 
The military men came to proclaim that they would protect 
the Emperor and the Imperial system by dedicating their 
lives. In turn, the Emperor came to rely on the military 
men. In the 1920s and 1930s, the more critical the situa-
tion became, the more the Emperor depended on the strength 
of the military. The Emperor's sanctioning of patriotic 
actions of young, spirited officers provided in turn a hot-
bed for military adventurism, which later the Emperor him-
self had a hard time dealing with. His attendant, Kinoshita 
Michie, described this circumstance: 
Because the military stood up under such circum-
stance, shouldering the frustrations of the na-
tion, it was extremely difficult to check the 
spirited young men who formed its core, even 
though they acted recklessly without regard to 
means. For their reckless behavior appeared to 
exhibit some common ground with the patriotic 
action of freeing the state from deadlock. 15 
The February 26 incident of 1936, an attempted coup d'etat 
15Kinoshita, Sokkin-nisshi, 211-12, cited in Bix, 
"Monologue," 335. 
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by young Army officers, was the first such disturbance the 
Emperor had to deal with. On that day, they attacked impor-
tant cabinet ministers and Imperial Palace ministers pro-
claiming that they would defeat the corrupt government offi-
cials who, they presumed, obstructed the Emperor's ruling of 
the nation. In those days, stringent poverty prevailed in 
rural areas from the economic depression, and many of the 
Army soldiers were from those agricultural areas. In the 
incident, the Treasury Minister Takahashi Korekiyo was 
killed, and Suzuki Kantaro, later Prime Minister at the end 
of the war, was seriously injured. Some Japanese historians 
assert that the Army officials of higher echelons who had 
intended to establish a strong military government conspired 
for the incident. The Emperor suppressed the incident by 
issuing a special Imperial order by mobilizing the major 
Army organization. However, the shadow of assassination and 
coup by the military continued to haunt the government and 
Court officials. 
The central principle of the Imperial Army and Navy 
was that the lives of soldiers were expendable for the well-
being of the Emperor and the Imperial System. According to 
17 
Army leadership, one of the Japanese advantages in the 
fighting in the homeland was that Japan still maintained a 
large number of human resources to spend even after war 
materials and other resources became scarce. 16 It was this 
expectation of the Emperor and Army men that dragged the war 
on so long. 
Kamikaze Suicide Attacks 
The extreme example of the dedication of the soldiers' 
lives to the Emperor was the Kamikaze Special Attack Force. 
The first Kamikaze attack took place on 25 October 1944, 
when five navy Zero Fighters, each carrying a 250 kilogram 
bomb, plunged into U.S. warships and transports off the 
coast of Leyte. Encouraged by the results, Vice Admiral 
Onishi Takijiro of the First Air Fleet hastily recruited new 
suicide forces. Army air force units soon followed suit. 
Until Japan's surrender in August 1945, and especially in 
the Battle of Okinawa, the Japanese employed more than 2,000 
planes for suicide attacks. 2535 Navy men and 1884 Army men 
were killed in these assaults on American ships. Thirty-
16Tanemura Sako, Daihon-ei Kimitsu-nisshi [Secret 
Dairies of the General Staff Office] August 11, 1944, 
(Tokyo: Fuyo-shobo, 1985), hereafter cited Tanemura. 
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four American ships were sunk and 288 damaged by these sui-
cide squads. 17 The operation of these suicide attackers was 
conducted under the full acknowledgment of the Emperor. 
When he heard about the Kamikaze attacks at Leyte, he ex-
pressed an emotional gratitude towards the Kamikaze fight-
ers: "Did they have to do to such extent? I admire their 
courage and dedication from my heart. 1118 The Emperor's ap-
preciation of the suicide attack meant his authorization of 
this tactic in the ongoing war. He and his followers per-
ceived that this way of suicidal offence was psychologically 
effective against the American forces. In the fall of 1944, 
the Emperor still held the belief that if the whole nation 
stood up in this spirit, it would be possible to gain a 
victory. On September 7, 1944, Hirohito announced at the 
opening ceremony of the 85th special session of the parlia-
ment: "The enemy offensive is getting severer and the situa-
tion more critical day by day. Now is the time to get vie-
17Fujiwara Akira, Awaya Kentaro, Yoshida Yutaka, Showa 
20 Nen. 1945 [Showa 20th Year, 1945) (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 
1995) I 112 • 
18Yamada Akira and Koketsu Atsushi, Ososugita Seidan; 
Showa Tenno no Senso-shido to Senso-sekinin [Emperor's 
Delayed Decision: Emperor Showa's Direction of the War and 
His Responsibility] (Tokyo: Showa-shuppan, 1991), 370. 
19 
tory by using all possible means. 1119 This is the period 
when the senior statesmen became more desperate about the 
war situation, and some of them began to voice an extreme 
idea of dedicating 100 million lives of the people to defend 
the national polity, that is, the Imperial rule by the Em-
peror. 20 However, the idea of "one hundred million Kamika-
zes" ended up only as those leaders' wishful thought. Hun-
ger, destruction of homes, and all other sufferings demoral-
ized the people. 
Tojo and Emperor 
The Emperor's close relation with the Army leaders, 
especially with Prime Minister Tojo Hideki, led to the Em-
peror's involvement in the war. He detested former Prime 
Minister Konoe as a person of weak will. 21 When Prince 
Takamatsu, Hirohito's younger brother, tried to persuade 
Hirohito not to rely on Tojo so much , the Emperor told his 
brother that he would not hear the advice of an irresponsi-
19 Ibid. I 174. 
20 rbid., 173. 
21Fujiwara, Tettei-kensho, 24. 
20 
ble court prince. Ironically, Konoe and Takamatsu were two 
of the most prominent people who saved the Emperor from his 
fatal decision to fight on in the homeland. On the other 
hand, the Emperor trusted Tojo significantly. Kido said 
that the Emperor preferred the Army leaders, especially 
Tojo, because they were willing to implement what the Em-
peror wanted. This feature was most remarkable in Tojo. 22 
Even when people began to criticize him in the middle of 
1944 after the repeated defeats in the Pacific, the Emperor 
still kept him as Prime Minister. A reporter of Asahi 
Shinbun [newspaper] recorded a conversation between Kido and 
Tojo: 
Kido: Military and domestic situations are not 
favorable for the nation. Have you ever consid-
ered resigning from the premiership? 
Tojo: It is regrettable that people began to criticize 
the government. However, since the Emperor's trust in 
me is unfading, I should not resign. 23 
The Emperor's trust in Tojo lasted even after Tojo resigned 
from the premiership on July 18, 1944. It meant that the 
Emperor maintained the same perception and policy of the 
22 Kido, March 20, 1946, cited in Yamada, Ososugita 
Seidan, 127. 
23Yamada, Ososugita Seidan, 128. 
21 
war. 
Yonai and Emperor 
However, we should not overlook the Emperor's cautious 
use of check and balance in the military and the government. 
According to the Imperial Constitution, the Emperor was 
supreme commander of the military and supervisor of the 
government; even though he tilted heavily on the side of the 
Army, he still maintained some check and balance in the 
military and the government. He trusted Navy Admiral Yonai 
Mitsumasa greatly, a man who opposed the Tripartite Pact of 
1940 and reluctantly participated in the military conflict 
with the United States. It was Yonai who confronted the 
Army position of continuing the war in the spring and summer 
of 1945 on the grounds that Japan had used up materials and 
food to fight on. During the war in Japan it was only Navy 
men who could restrain the Army's will to fight on. 
22 
Emperor's Engagement in the War 
Different from MacArthur's report to Eisenhower, the 
Emperor Hirohito was quite active in directing the war. In 
the way he was involved in the war, we see that the Emperor 
was not forced to acknowledge what the Army did, but he 
behaved literally as supreme commander for the Japanese Army 
and Navy, if not an excellent one. 
(1) Shanghai 
Earlier in 1937, when the war with China spread to 
Shanghai, while Prime Minister Konoe wanted to restrain the 
Japanese advance, the Emperor earnestly encouraged the rein-
forcement of troops from Japan to Shanghai. 24 From the Em-
peror's earlier statement that sending Japanese troops to 
Manchuria was no problem, but invading northern China would 
cause troubles with Anglo-American forces, it is hard to 
deny his responsibility for the war both in China and in the 
Pacific. If Hirohito and Konoe together had tried to pre-
vent further incursion of Japanese forces in China, it would 
have been possible to reverse the tide toward the war. 
Hirohito's everlasting pursuit of exploiting China for Ja-
24Fujiwara, Tettei-kensho, 32. 
pan's prosperity was in the background of his attitude to-
ward China. 
(2) Bataan 
23 
In early 1942, the Japanese forces in the Philippines 
were attacking the United States' fortress at Bataan. Impa-
tient at the slow progress of the campaign, with fewer 
forces required to do the task, Hirohito frequently pressed 
the General Staff Off ice to reinforce the troops and get the 
work done quickly. 25 
(3) Guadalcanal 
Hirohito pointed out three times the problem of not 
using the air power more extensively at the battle of 
Guadalcanal (August 7, 1942-February 1, 1943). The next day 
after his third request, the Army sent the air planes to the 
field. 26 
(4) New Guinea 
After the retreat of the Japanese armed forces from 
Guadalcanal, Hirohito suggested that just retreating would 
25 Ibid. , 70. 
26 Ibid. I 71. 
' 
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not be good, and the Japanese should open new fronts for 
offensive movements to engage American forces. Yamada Akira 
says that the Japanese campaign in New Guinea was at quite a 
standstill and contributed to the prolongation of the war. 27 
The Emperor's occasional messages of appreciation and 
encouragement led the Army to give more attention and effort 
to the campaign in New Guinea, yielding, in turn, neglect in 
other areas . 28 
(5) Naval Battles 
After the annihilation of the Japanese troops (2,500 
men) at Attu Islands on May 29, 1943, Hirohito demanded 
naval engagements with the American ships. Navy Chief of 
Staff Nagano Osami responded that the Navy would soon oblit-
erate American naval forces. Since it did not come true, 
Hirohito scolded Nagano sternly. 29 
(6) Absolute Defense Parameters 
On September 30, 1943, the Imperial Conference decided 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. I 72. 
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to set up new defense parameters in the Pacific. The Em-
peror insisted on this occasion that "defense parameters" 
did not mean that Japanese would defend only, but that they 
had to attack the enemy whenever they found the opportu-
nity. 30 
(7) Recapturing Saipan 
After the Japanese defeat at Saipan (July 7, 1944), the 
Emperor asked the General Staff Off ice to make a plan for 
retaking the island. Even after Tojo told the Emperor that 
it would be impossible, the Emperor persistently asked it. 31 
This episode attests that the Emperor knew how important the 
island of Saipan was for Japan's defense. However, the 
story also indicates his recklessness regarding the situa-
tion, the relative military strength of his side and the 
enemy's, and the safety of his soldiers. 
(8) Beating Americans at Leyte 
The Battle of Leyte was fought on October 24, 1944. 
For the advisability of this battle, there were vehement 
30 Ibid. 
31Ibid. 
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arguments among the generals. The Emperor's opinion pre-
vailed. He said that after beating American forces at 
Leyte, Americans would be brought to peace negotiation. 32 
(9) Landing Japanese Troops on Okinawa 
United States armed forces landed on Okinawa on April 
1, 1945, and rapidly occupied large areas of the island. 
Hirohito was stunned, and suggested to Chief of Staff Umezu 
that since Okinawa was so important, if the number of Japa-
nese troops was not enough, Umezu should decide to send 
reinforcements from the sea. Yamada says that the Emperor 
at this time ignored the situation at Okinawa: 1500 American 
ships including 40 carriers and 20 battleships were sur-
rounding the island, and 1600 American planes were engaging 
in the air raid. Yamada also says that the Emperor was so 
impatient that he urged the Staff Off ice to take more off en-
sive tactics while the military leaders in Okinawa wanted to 
fight a protracted war hiding in mountains and caves. 
Yamada points out that the Emperor's confusing order was one 
of the causes of the high casualty rate in the Battle of 
32Te.rasaki Hidenari, Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku, [Showa 
Emperor's Monologue] (Tokyo: Bunshun-bunko, 1995), 118. 
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Okinawa that officially ended on June 23. 33 
(10) Attack Yun-nan in China 
After the collapse of Okinawa became clear, the Emperor 
suggested Yun-nan as a new battlefront to damage consider-
ably the Americans and the British. Chief of Staff Umezu 
did not consent to the idea, saying that Japan could not 
supply materials to that area. 34 
Emperor Wanted to Fight On 
These are only a few examples that testify to the Em-
peror's involvement in the operations of the war. It is 
remarkable that even after numerous defeats, the Emperor 
always demanded new battlefronts to fight. Probably he 
thought that it would demoralize the Japanese forces and 
give momentum to the enemy if the Japanese only retreated 
after defeat. The Emperor believed that the Japanese would 
win until early 1945. It was obvious to the eyes of the 
Emperor that the United States was materially far superior 
to Japan. Hirohito wished victory which was similar to that 
33Yamada, Ososugita Seidan, 183. 
34Terasaki, Dokuhakuroku, 114 . 
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in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, that is, by concen-
trating all available resources (material and human) , the 
Emperor thought that Japanese could inflict enough damage to 
an important section of the enemy to open negotiations for 
peace. In reality, it was Japan that suffered far more in a 
war of attrition. 
Emperor and Military Matters 
After the war, Hirohito wrote a letter to his son, 
Prince Akihito, the present-day Emperor, telling him the 
causes of the Japan's defeat in the Pacific war: 
The Japanese emphasized too much faith in "God's 
nation" and the spirit derived from it, and ig-
nored the power of science. The Japanese underes-
timated the military strength of the United States 
and Great Britain. Japan lacked competent mili-
tary leaders such as Oyama Iwao and Yamagata 
Aritomo, the generals Japan saw at the time of the 
Russo-Japanese War. Military men, without a grand 
view of the situation, just arrogantly advanced 
forward. 35 
Since Hirohito was quite free of any kind of criticism, it 
seems that he did not develop a habit of self-reflection. 
So, while he accused others a lot, he did not talk much 
about his mistakes in his direction of the war. It was 
35Terasaki, Dokuhakuroku, 100. 
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Hirohito who promulgated the spirit of "God's nation," and 
it was he who insisted on continuing the war and supervised 
military operations. It was unfortunate for the Japanese in 
those days that Japan did not have competent military lead-
ers who could properly advise the Emperor in his involvement 
in the war. 
What Made The Emperor Continue the War? 
After the watershed of the war, that is, the defeat at 
Saipan, on July 7, 1944, the Emperor continued the war not 
because he wanted to acquire new territory, but because he 
wanted a victory from the Allied forces so that the Japanese 
could end the war on better terms. He feared that if Japan 
surrendered to the Allies, the Allies would force the Japa-
nese to accept unconditional surrender terms and to abrogate 
the Imperial System. 36 The well-being of the Imperial Fam-
ily was the Emperor's, court people's, and government offi-
cials' primary concern. 
Prince Higashikuni was very much concerned about the 
future of the Emperor and the Imperial System because he 
belonged to the Imperial Family. On January 18, 1945, he 
36Terasaki, Dokuhakuroku, 141 . 
recorded in his diary his view on an American radio broad-
cast concerning the United States postwar policy toward 
Japan. The interesting point is that he noticed that the 
American policy was modified to more generous terms: 
According to the American radio broadcasting, we 
know that in America people in various sections 
are now discussing the postwar policy on Japan. 
Before, there were opinions that asserted the 
termination of Japan as a nation. Nowadays such 
extreme ideas have receded, and discussions are 
going on concerning what systems the Japanese 
nation can take. Today's announcement goes as 
follows: 1. Japan can exist as a democratic na-
tion. 2. The Imperial System should be abolished. 
3. Army, Navy, Air Forces should be dissolved. 4. 
Those who were responsible for the war, and the 
military cliques, should be punished. 5. Japan 
should abandon Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, Ryukyu 
Islands, and the Pacific Trustee Islands. 6. The 
Allies deploy their forces at important points in 
the Japanese homeland. Reading this announcement, 
I think that we should not allow these things to 
happen. We have to strengthen our defense. As an 
Imperial Family member I should do my best to 
protect the Imperial Family. 37 
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It seems that Higashikuni spoke here for the Emperor. Early 
in 1945, there was a belief among the Japanese that the 
United States would not allow the Imperial System to con-
tinue in Japan if Japan surrendered, and Higashikuni pointed 
37Higashikuni Naruhiko, Higashikuni Nikki [Higashikuni 
Diaries] January 18, 1945. 
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out that the American broadcast supplied the ground for 
Japanese determination to fight the war to the end. All 
these terms sounded so harsh to the ears of the Japanese 
that this kind of American broadcast just contributed to 
solidifying the Japanese determination to fight to the end. 
End of Japanese Military and Imperial System 
Four years later, on December 20, 1949, Kido, chief 
adviser to the Emperor, shared with an officer of the occu-
pation forces his recollection of the Emperor in early 
1945: : 
The Emperor's idea was that he could not help 
continuing to fight the war because he was afraid 
that Japan would be disarmed upon surrendering to 
the Allies. He often told me that a nation with-
out its military cannot survive as a nation. 38 
For Hirohito, a nation meant a national polity with the 
present Imperial Family at its center. From his experience 
he was fully aware that in modern Japan the Imperial System 
had been empowered and protected from internal and interna-
tional threats by the strong military, and the Emperor stood 
at the highest point in the military according to the Impe-
rial Constitution of 1889. During the war, the Imperial 
38Fujiwara, Tenno no Showashi, 90. 
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Family got further entangled with the war mainly by the 
Emperor's active involvement in it. At this stage of the 
war, the end of the Japanese military seemed to the Emperor 
to be the end of the Imperial System. 
Konoe and the Emperor 
During the war, Prince Takamatsu, Hirohito's younger 
brother, said that it was only Konoe, former Prime Minister, 
who could estimate the international, domestic, and military 
situation objectively. In February 1945, the Emperor sum-
moned senior statesmen one by one to hear their advice. 
They were former prime ministers and chief court attendants. 
According to the Emperor's memoir, while other statesmen 
voiced ambiguous or optimistic views of the war, it was only 
Konoe who stated a pessimistic view concerning the ongoing 
war. On February 14, Konoe told the Emperor to terminate 
the war immediately. The Emperor responded to him saying 
that he had still to see the result of the coming military 
campaign at Okinawa, for the Navy and Army were ready for it 
with high morale. According to the Emperor's dictated mem-
oir, it was Navy Chief of Staff Oikawa who promised the 
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Emperor a very certain victory in Okinawa. 39 Hirohito said 
to Konoe that it would be better for the Japanese to ask 
peace after a significant military achievement in a battle. 
Konoe then said to Hirohito, "I wonder if such an occasion 
of victory will really visit you. If it comes, it should be 
early enough, not half a year, or a year later." 40 Hirohito 
continued the war because he still believed Japan could win. 
This instance of Okinawa reveals that the Emperor's errone-
ous conviction was primarily based on misinformation given 
him by his military advisors. 
At this time, the Emperor asked Konoe if the United 
States had the intention to abolish the Imperial System. 
Konoe answered that considering the opinions of former Am-
bassador to Japan Grew and some other American officials, 
Americans would not eliminate the Imperial System. The Em-
peror then said that he had some doubt about Army chief 
Umezu's statement that the United States would abolish the 
Imperial System of Japan. 41 Even though the Emperor still 
39Terasaki, Dokuhakuroku, 119. 
40 Ibid., 102-3. 
41Hosokawa Morisada, Hosokawa Nikki [Hosokawa Diaries] 
February 16, 1945 (Tokyo: Chuko-bunko,1979). 
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followed the military line of continuing the war, and re-
jected Konoe's advice, the Emperor still paid some respect 
to Konoe's opinion about ending the war. In February 1945, 
the Emperor came to the point where he wanted to know the 
United States' intention regarding the post-war status of 
the Japanese Emperor. 
Iriye Akira, a historian specializing in United States-
Japanese diplomatic relations, points out the significance 
of this meeting between the Emperor and Konoe. Iriye says 
that it was Konoe who told the Emperor on this occasion that 
unless the Emperor swept away the fanatical elements of the 
Japanese Army, Japan could not approach the United States, 
Britain, and China about concluding the war. Konoe thought 
that it was the only way to save the Japanese domestic or-
der. 42 When the Emperor was still thinking about winning a 
victory by using the military, Konoe tried to persuade the 
Emperor into reconsidering his relationship with the Army 
elements who were promoting the continuation of the war. 
His opinion that the United States would not enter into 
42 Iriye Akira, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American 
War. 1941-1945 (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 
England: Harvard University Press, 1981), 236. 
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negotiations with Japan for ending the war if the Japanese 
government did not detach itself from the Army pointed out 
the heart of the problem in the Japanese process of ending 
the war. Even though this position was not understood and 
adopted by the Japanese leadership as a whole until the 
final days of the war, the fact that Konoe clarified the 
center of the problem in the Japanese course of the war 
was significant. As long as the Japanese continued to be 
controlled by the Army, the Japanese could not end the 
war. As Konoe had already suggested to the Emperor in 
February, the Japanese were finally able to bring the war 
to an end in August 1945 by refusing to hear what the Army 
men commanded, that is, the retention of the Japanese 
military and the refusal to have Japan occupied by foreign 
troops. In the spring and summer of 1945, the Japanese 
leaders who intended to bring the war to its end found 
that how the nation's army treated became the most 
important issue. The Japanese Army's resistance to peace 
was motivated by its desire to save itself from 
dissolution. When the Imperial System and the national 
polity became endangered by the continuation of the war, 
the Emperor and the civilian government officials than 
resolutely dealing with the tough and stubborn military 
men. 
CHAPTER II 
THE CRITICAL SITUATION IN JAPAN 
In early summer of 1945, in addition to repeated de-
feats in the battles in the Pacific and South Asia and ex-
hausting campaigns on the Chinese mainland, the Japanese 
were enduring severe air raids and serious food shortages. 
Quite contrary to the government statements on radio broad-
casts and newspaper reports, the morale of the Japanese 
people was actually deteriorating. Some government offi-
cials and military men estimated that Japan would be unable 
to continue the war in the near future. Some of them were 
even concerned that if the war continued, the Japanese gov-
ernment would collapse by itself from hunger and revolts of 
the people. 
Soldiers' Remains 
A tremendous number of soldiers' remains from the Pa-
cific islands and the China mainland were returned to their 
homes. At the same time, the government was deceiving the 
people by saying that Japan had been winning the war, and 
the war would soon end in a total victory. On November 17, 
1995, I interviewed a 60-year-old Japanese man in Hamamatsu, 
Japan. He said that he was an elementary school boy in the 
last year of the war. Since his father was a Shinto priest, 
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he often saw a great number of remains coming to his home 
for religious purification. Even though he was a small boy, 
he interpreted the announcements of the General Staff Off ice 
on the radio that Japan was winning as false because he 
thought that if it were true, he would not have seen so many 
remains sent to his home. In those years of the war, many 
bereaved families felt the misery of war, and prayed for the 
early termination of the war. 
Air Raids 
United States Air Force General Henry H. Arnold said 
that American conventional aerial bombing had sufficiently 
pounded Japanese cities before the use of the atomic bomb: 
The surrender of Japan was not entirely the result 
of the two atomic bombs. We had hit some 60 Japa-
nese cities with our regular H.E. and incendiary 
bombs, and as a result of our raids, about 241,000 
people had been killed, 313,000 wounded, and about 
2,333,000 homes destroyed. Our B-29's had 
destroyed most of the Japanese industries and, 
with the laying of mines which prevented the ar-
rival of incoming cargoes of critical items, had 
made it impossible to carry on a large-scale war. 
We had destroyed 10,343 enemy airplanes, compared 
to the 29,900 destroyed in Europe. Accordingly, 
it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no 
atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the 
verge of collapse. 1 
If we inspect the nature of Japanese houses and residential 
areas, and consider the very poor level of the Japanese air 
defense system, we will find that Japanese cities in the 
year of 1945 were far more vulnerable to aerial bombing than 
1Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission, (Blue Ridge Summit, 
PA: Tab Books, 1949), 598. 
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the cities in Germany. The Japanese housing made extensive 
damage inevitable. So Arnold did not necessarily exaggerate 
the fact to promote the interest of the United States Air 
Force. 
In 1945, most of the Japanese houses were built mainly 
of wood, bamboo, plaster, and paper. They were very vulner-
able to incendiary bombs. Also, Japanese streets were very 
narrow, especially in urban areas. Most of the houses in 
cities stood side by side separated only by inches. The 
ratio of the area of houses against the whole area of the 
region in the Japanese cities was from 40 to 50 per cent, 
while in American cities it was about 10 percent. 2 So in 
the Japanese cities, once a part of the region caught fire, 
it would have spread quite easily and rapidly. 
American B-29s, which flew higher than 10,000 meters 
above the ground, were no match for the Japanese planes 
which were made light to fly fast, and significantly, lower 
than 8,500 meters high. Japanese planes were lightly ar-
mored for this purpose, as was the case with the Zero-
fighter planes. This was the reason why Japanese planes 
were very vulnerable to the American attacks in the air, as 
in the case of the Mariana Turkey Shoot of June 1944, in 
which American fighter planes easily shot down their 
Japanese counterparts. As for anti-aircraft guns, the 
2Saotome Katsumoto, Tokyo Daikushu [Tokyo Great Air 
Raid], (Tokyo: Iwanami-shinsho, 1971), 180. 
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Japanese ones were capable of targeting objects only 5,000 
to 6,000 meters high. 
Also by the time of the start of the American air raids 
on Japanese cities, a huge number of Japanese planes and 
expert pilots were already killed in the battles on the 
Pacific islands. Above all, the Japanese military had not 
fully prepared for an anti-air defense. A man in Kokura 
city told a representative of American Strategic Bombing 
Survey that: 
We were not def ended from the Allied aerial 
bombings. This situation was the same all over 
Japan. The government leaders are responsible 
for the misery of the people from air raids. 
They forced us to engage in the war. However, 
they did not protect us from the aerial attacks. 3 
The sixty-year-old man I interviewed told me that 
during air raids American bombers freely bombed whatever 
targets they wanted and he saw no Japanese planes flying for 
defense. He thought at that time that this situation was 
not what the winning nation could provide for the people. 
By the way, Japan was among the first nations that 
initiated air raids on the civilians in cities. For the 
first Japanese air raid on a city, on October 8, 1931, 
during the Manchurian incident, the Japanese Army planes 
bombed Chin-chou in Manchuria. From 1939 to 1941, the 
Japanese Army air forces bombarded Chong-chin, the 
3Fujiwara Akira, Awaya Kentaro, Yoshida Yutaka, Yamada 
Akira, Showa 20 Nen. 1945, [Showa 20th Year, 1945) (Tokyo: 
Shogakukan, 1995), 83, hereafter cited Fujiwara, Showa 20. 
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Nationalists' government capital, 195 times and caused about 
12,000 casualties. 4 So the Japanese military attacked 
overseas civilians and did not effectively protect Japanese 
civilians from the American air raids. 
Not only the Japanese Army failed to def end the people 
from air raids, but also the Army destroyed Japanese 
citizens' houses for its own convenience. The government 
and the Army gave the order to smash houses which were 
located near the edges of factories, transport centers, and 
military bases so that these installations would not catch 
spreading fire. Altogether 614,000 housing units were 
cleared away, usually by members of nearby neighbor 
associations working with ropes and hand tools. One fifth 
of all the housing destroyed by the war was lost in this 
manner, sending more than 3.5 million city residents out to 
hunt new places to live. 5 This data reveals the low esteem 
the Japanese government and military had for the life of the 
people during the war. The military installations were far 
more important for them. 
After the war, British scientific historian P.M.S. 
Blackett compared the air defenses of Japan and Germany 
during World War II in the book titled Military and 
4Fujiwara, Showa 20, 80. 
5Thomas R. H. Havens, Valley of Darkness: The Japanese 
People and World War II (New York: W.W. Norton & Company 
Inc., 1978), 158. 
Political Consequences of Atomic Energy. He explained how 
easy it was for Americans to use atomic weapons in the 
Japanese air where the anti-air defense was almost 
nonexistent in the summer of 1945. On the other hand, the 
German industrial and technological levels of producing 
airplanes was much higher than their Japanese counterpart, 
and Germans had a superb anti-air defense system. 6 
Air Raid on Tokyo 
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The first major American air raid on Tokyo occurred on 
November 24, 1944, with eighty-eight B-29s bombing the 
Nakajima Airplane Manufacturing Company. For the first 
stage of the Tokyo bombing, only the military facilities and 
factories were targeted. However, from March 10, 1945, 
civilians' living quarters began to be bombed. From 0:07 to 
2:37 AM on that morning, about 300 American bombers, that 
took off from the air fields on Mariana Islands, dropped 
189,590 large and small incendiary bombs in the area of 40 
square kilometers in Tokyo from the height of 1,500 to 3,000 
meters above the ground, about three bombs within the area 
of one square meter. 7 Saotome Katsumoto, the author of the 
book entitled The Tokyo Daikushu [The Tokyo Great Air Raid] 
5P.M.S. Blackett, Military and Political Consequences 
of Atomic Energy [The title of the American publication: 
Fear. War. and the Bomb] (New York and Tront: Whittlesey 
House. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1948), 10, 66, 134. 
7Saotome, Tokyo Daikushu, 15. 
quotes from M. Amline's account of the Tokyo air raid: 
The Air Force specialists chose targeting areas 
and estimated the expected number of deaths. As 
soon as the order was issued, hundreds of planes 
took off. Guiding planes dropped flare bombs first 
to illuminate the targeting areas. Merciless 
sorties of bombers arrived one after another, and 
incendiary bombs were dropped to destroy the 
industrial areas and surrounding residential areas 
completely. 8 
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In about two and a half hours, within the area of 40 square 
kilometers, 250 thousand houses were burnt down, 85 thousand 
people died, 40 thousand were injured, and one million 
people lost their homes. 9 The American tactics for this 
attack was to encircle one area with flame by the use of 
incendiary bombs containing napalm that caused fire very 
effectively. Then other kinds of incendiary bombs were 
dropped to cause fire inside the circle. The people inside 
the circle ran toward the center of the circle only to 
become a lump of charcoal. 10 The way the bombing of Tokyo 
on March 10 was conducted is by no means accepted. However, 
it is amazing that the Japanese military and the government 
allowed this kind of disaster to happen. American crews in 
this bombing mission reported to their headquarters earlier 
in this attack that they did not see any Japanese countering 
planes, though they encountered marginal shots from 
8 Ibid., 178. 
9 Ibid., 181. 
10 Ibid., 188. 
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antiaircraft guns. 11 In the spring of 1945, the Japanese 
government and Army were too much preoccupied with the 
coming Allied invasion of the Japanese homeland and did not 
devise any substantial measures to deal with the ongoing and 
immediate disasters inflicted by the American attacks from 
the air. While the military was crying for one hundred 
million suicides for the war in the homeland, the city 
dwellers were losing confidence in the prospect for victory. 
An Army officer's opinion, concerning the chaos among 
the people after the Tokyo air raid, reveals the gap between 
the situation of the people and the intention of the Army. 
Colonel Sato Hiroo, Army Quartermaster, said on March 26: 
The attitudes of people today are deplorable. When 
they should do their best to prepare for the coming 
battle with the Allied forces on our homeland, they 
are just preoccupied with evacuating from Tokyo. 
Train coaches are filled with baggages for 
evacuation, and roads are crowded with evacuees. 
What a shame that people just think about their 
life. Government and military leaders do nothing 
with this problem. We, the Army and Navy, will 
just do our best to win a victory in the battle on 
homeland. 12 
This Army officer's statement represented the total lack of 
strategical thinking of the Japanese Army. As Blackett 
stated in his book, the aerial offense and defense were 
very important features of World War II, as preludes to 
landing operations, with its purpose of destruction of war 
facilities to destroy enemy war power, and destruction of 
11 Ibid., 180. 
12Colonel Sato Hiroo's Statement, Takagi Memoir. 
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cities to demoralize the population. 13 Without considering 
any measures to defend cities from aerial attacks, their 
crying for victory just revealed their irresponsibility in 
the operation of the war. People became more and more 
suspicious of the statement of the government and military 
that Japan was approaching its victory. According to the 
Strategical Bombing Survey, in June 1944, only 10 per cent 
of the people doubted Japanese ultimate victory. In the 
spring of 1945, the number increased to 50 per cent. For 
its motivation, 34 per cent of those who doubted said that 
they doubted because of air raids, and 28 per cent because 
of the destruction of military facilities and continuing 
defeats. 14 
Hosokawa Morisada, Konoe's son-in-law and secretary, 
depicted the anger of citizens in Tokyo in his diary: 
Some Tokyo citizens who suffered the disaster from 
the air raid protested the Army officers who came 
to investigate the damage by a military car 
splashing mud along the road and wearing fine 
clothes: People shouted to the officers, "You, the 
Army, make us suffer this way." 
People were tired of the war, and they knew that the Army 
was still insisting on continuing the war at the expense of 
life and property of citizens. The Army issued the order of 
compulsory evacuation at will. Hosokawa added a question to 
his diary: "Did any other Army exist in the Japanese history 
13Blackett, Military and Political Consequences of 
Atomic Energy, 69. 
14Fujiwara, Showa 20, 82. 
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that was so cruel as the present-day Japanese Army?" 
Hosokawa also recorded the suffering of people in Kyoto and 
Osaka areas from air raids. He said that every street was 
full of people who were evacuating and carrying things to 
the countryside, and everyone he met said that he or she 
hoped that the war would soon end. 15 
On May 25, there was another large air raid on Tokyo, 
which was less severe than the air raid in March. The 
Imperial house and Meiji Shrine, where the late Meiji 
Emperor was enshrined, was burnt by spreading fire. 
Watching the Imperial Palace burning and shedding tears, 
Prime Minister Suzuki bowed for a long time, and later 
issued a statement of apology to the Emperor: "We will 
apologize to the Emperor for the burning of the Imperial 
Palace by pledging that we will fight the war to the bitter 
end." War Minister Anami presented a request for his own 
resignation because he was unable to protect the Imperial 
House from the air raid disaster. The Emperor responded to 
Anami by saying that the Emperor would pardon him and asked 
him to do his best to assist the Emperor in the very 
critical time for the nation. 16 
15Ibid. , March 2 9. 
16Tanaka Nobumasa, Dokyumento Showa Tenno (5) Haisen 
[Documented History of Showa Emperor] (Tokyo: Ryokufu-
shuppan, 1988), 239. 
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Food Shortages 
In the summer of 1945, the Japanese people became more 
and more hungry from the shortages of food. Because of this 
dire food situation, some government and military officials 
estimated that Japan could not continue the war into autumn. 
Prince Higashikuni recorded on May 12 that a House of 
Representative, Hirano Rikizo, reported to him that then in 
May people were eating rice that was stored for use during 
August, so in August there would not be enough rice to 
distribute, and wheat production would decrease 
considerably, so the food situation would become more and 
more serious. 17 Before 1945, in Japan industries and 
agriculture were quite labor intense, that is, human skill 
and a large amount of man power were indispensable in its 
industries and agriculture. After millions of men were 
drafted to military service, the labor situation greatly 
affected the agricultural production. 
Fish is an important source of protein for the 
Japanese. It was put on ration during the war. For the 
adult man, it was 50g a day in April 1941, 36.5g in 1942, 
10.5g in January 1945, Og in August 1945. The ration of 
sugar was stopped in August 1944. 18 This government record 
reveals how the food situation deteriorated as the war went 
17Higashikuni, May 12, 1945. 
18Showashi Kenkyukai, Showashi Jiten [Dictionary of 
Showa History] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1984), 330. 
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on. 
With the scarcity of rice, any plants that were 
considered edible were eaten. On November 1, 1944, the 
government issued a special direction to all elementary 
schools in the nation that school children gather acorns for 
food. They were to be processed into flour in village 
factories. 19 On June 14, attendants and servants at the 
Imperial court ate a strange kind of flour that tasted 
bitter and did not satisfy them. The rumor that what they 
ate was acorn flour spread quickly. On that day the Emperor 
suffered from diarrhea not because of acorn flour but from 
fatigue. 20 
On June 8, 1945, Marquis Kido feared the effect of the 
food shortages on the social order: 
So it has to be observed that most of these 
supplies [foodstuffs] will have to be lost, 
especially in small towns and villages all over 
the country, since their antiaircraft defense has 
hardly amounted to anything. If this is correct, 
the extreme shortage of provisions and food stuffs 
that will sweep the country in the latter part of 
this year and thereafter---in light of the 
approaching chilly season---will cause serious 
unrest among the people at large. And, in 
consequence, the situation will be beyond 
salvation21 
Akinaga was Chief of the Plans Coordination Bureau. His 
19This is the story I heard from my 81-year-old mother 
in the summer of 1995. 
2°Kojima Jo, Tenno [Emperor], (Tokyo: Bunshun-bunko, 
1981) : 226. 
21Kido, June 8 . 
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report to the Supreme War Council on June 6, on the Japanese 
social and economic conditions staggered government and 
military leaders including the Emperor. Among the factors 
that indicated the Japanese dire situation, he pointed out 
the importance of the food problem. He reported that in 
certain areas of Japan, the possibility of starvation of 
people was looming. 22 The participants in the conference 
also felt the immediate problem of food shortage, since they 
lived in Tokyo, where problems from air raids and food 
shortage was most severe. 
Since 1944, it became usual for the citizens in the 
cities to go out quite often to buy food in the agricultural 
areas, often with the whole family participating. They 
exchanged their belongings for food. Including rice, some 
agricultural food items were on ration. So it was illegal 
to sell and purchase agricultural products such as rice. 
Prosecutors became so busy in dealing with this illegal 
conduct of people that at some point they predicted looming 
social chaos from food shortages in the near future. 23 
Strict regulations of the life of people were the base of 
the Imperial System that enabled the nation to engage in 
war. However, as air raids became severer and food 
22Robert Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, 
(Stanford, California, 1954), 94. 
23Shiryo Nippon Gendaishi 13 [Sources of Modern 
Japanese History], (Tokyo: Otsukishoten, 1985), cited in 
Fujiwara, Showa 20. 
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shortages became more intense, the controlling of the people 
was becoming more difficult. 
Shortage of Oil 
Oil shortages were not less serious than the food 
shortages for the continuation of the war. For Japan, the 
issue of securing oil had been important. This had been one 
of the causes of the war between Japan and the United 
States. Now the scarcity of oil would become one of the 
causes for Japan to cease the conflict. February 6, 1945, 
Higashikuni recorded: 
The government is now in consternation after 
finding that from now on no oil will come from 
South-east Asia. For the substitution, the 
government has just recently started to produce 
artificial oil from potatoes. 24 
Higashikuni added that the Japanese Navy lost most of its 
power partly because of oil shortages. He did not point out 
the important cause of the oil shortages. Japan wanted oil 
from South East Asia, however the destruction of Japanese 
naval ships in the battles with the United States naval 
forces made it impossible to enable Japan to transport oil 
from the south. Also, U.S. submarines were intercepting and 
sinking most Japanese merchant ships by early 1945. For the 
source of new Japanese fuel, Navy Chief of Staff Oikawa said 
to Marquis Kido on April 5, that "As regards oil, we have 
enough stock for six months. And after that we will depend 
24Higashikuni, February 6, 1945. 
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on the pine root oil." On the same day Kido heard a similar 
statement from Army Chief of Staff Umezu: "Though we are 
most concerned about oil supply, we still have enough stock 
to hold out for several months. 1125 These chiefs of staff 
knew that without oil the conduct of war would be 
impossible. With the knowledge that Japan would not have 
oil in the near future, they still proclaimed that Japan 
should continue the war. Since the Navy leadership actually 
considered the battle of Okinawa as the Navy's final battle, 
they almost used up the resources they had in Okinawa. On 
June 22, on the day when the defeat in Okinawa was reported, 
Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa began to assert that since 
Japan did not have sufficient materials to engage in the 
war, the Japanese military was no longer able to continue 
the war. He predicted that Japan would plunge into crisis 
around August. 26 
Internal Crisis to the Emperor 
(1) Konoe was concerned about the Japanese domestic 
situation. In February 1945, the Emperor invited Former 
Prime Ministers and other senior statesmen to the court to 
hear their advice concerning the ways to overcome the 
25Kido, April 5, 1945, in Kido Koichi The Diary of 
MarQuis Kido. 1931-45 (Frederick, Maryland: University 
Publications of America, 1984). 
26Sanematsu Jo, ed., Yonai Mitsumasa Oboegaki [Yonai 
Mitsumasa's Memoir], (Tokyo: Kojinsha, 1988), 142; hereafter 
Yonai, Memoir. 
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looming national crisis. Among those advisors only Konoe 
advised early termination of the war, because he thought the 
chaos from the defeat after the Allied landing on the main 
islands of Japan would give communists good opportunities 
for social revolution. 
Quite different from other statesmen, Konoe was 
courageous enough to advise the Emperor to rethink his 
relationship with the Japanese Army, especially the radical 
elements within it, for Konoe thought that they were in the 
core for the war policy of bringing to the fighting on the 
homeland. He said that he feared mainly the national 
renovationists in the military, because a majority of 
Japan's military men came from families below the middle 
class, so it was easy for them to fall prey to communist 
doctrine. They tended to sympathize with the poverty in the 
life of the people and a rising voice of labor. Also, in 
the military education, military men were inculcated with 
the importance of "national polity", and Konoe thought that 
communists would exploit this point by saying that "national 
polity" and "communism" were compatible. 
Konoe was also concerned that the enmity of the people 
toward the United States and Britain increasing through the 
bitter war would make them give more attention toward the 
Soviet Union. He was fully aware of the Soviets' efforts 
"to establish Soviet regimes" in Eastern Europe and "to 
promote the creation of at least pro-Soviet governments 
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throughout the rest of Europe". 27 From Konoe' s point of 
view, it was desirable for Japan to cease the war 
immediately and mitigate the suffering and anger of the 
people because in this way Japan could avoid social 
revolution. As Prince Takamatsu once pointed out, Konoe was 
the only person in Japan who was able to consider the 
process of the war in the context of the domestic political 
and economic conditions and the international environment. 
While other senior statesmen generally yielded to the 
Emperor's and military's rather optimistic war policies, 
Konoe saw the military situation, and domestic and 
international political conditions realistically. His 
primary concern was not necessarily mitigating the suffering 
of the people, but rather defending the Imperial System. 
Konoe's advice of February 1945 to the Emperor is important 
in that he proposed a radical change in the Imperial 
government's attitude toward the military and the ongoing 
war with regards to the possibility of social chaos. 
(2) Kido was worried about social instability. Kido 
was the most important person in influencing the Emperor. 
He met the Emperor almost every day, and people stopped by 
Kido's office in the Palace after they met the Emperor. 
Konoe said once that to change the Emperor's idea about the 
war, he first had to persuade Kido. 
27Robert Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1954), 
47. 
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Kido regularly heard reports from the national 
intelligence off ice for domestic security to find if there 
were any moves against the Imperial House and the war 
efforts among the people. So his opinion about the attitude 
of the people toward the war and the Imperial throne was 
based on real facts. On April 5, when senior statesmen 
gathered for discussions on the selection of a new Prime 
Minister and the proceeding of the war, Kido reported to the 
conference: 
When the mainland is about to turn into a 
battlefield, the internal situation is immensely 
deplorable. The nation has not necessarily been 
cooperating with the government's administrative 
policies but has been what we call "looking 
aside." Even considering things like foodstuffs, 
increased production, and peace and order, we must 
form a Cabinet worthy of the people's trust. I 
should also like to call your particular attention 
to the fact that antimilitarism has become rather 
conspicuous lately. 28 
Different from the government and military's slogan "One 
hundred million people are determined to fight to death," 
this report indicates that people were tired of the ongoing 
war, and some people even began to oppose the government war 
policies. It is clear that few people really wanted "one 
hundred million suicides' war", and the more the government 
forced the people to fight on, the more it alienated them 
from it. Undesirable results from the war, that is, a 
staggering number of soldiers' deaths from the fronts, the 
suffering of the people from air raids, and the situation of 
28Kido, April 5, 1945. 
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near starvation, were awakening the people from a long sleep 
of the forced bond between the Emperor and the people. Even 
though the people were inculcated since childhood that "To 
die for the Emperor and the nation is an honorable thing," 
they gradually became aware of the ridiculousness of this 
teaching, facing the evils of the war and recognizing that 
the Emperor was responsible for the continuation of the war. 
So, Kido was most concerned about the criticism against the 
Emperor from among the people. From the records of the 
office of internal security, we can see what complaints 
people at that time had: 
If Japan were to lose the war, the Emperor would 
be responsible, not the people. Whether the 
United States or Stalin were to control Japan, we 
the people do not care (arrest) . 
The Emperor killed lots of sons of the people, 
but he appears to be insensitive about the sorrows 
of the people (arrest) . 
Roosevelt and Churchill travel around the world 
for the solution of the war. How about our 
Emperor. He is making poems with his lady 
attendants at the Palace. If the late Maiji 
Emperor had lived, he would have gone at least as 
far as Taiwan (complaining letter to the Imperial 
House) . 29 
Under the Public Peace Maintenance Law of 1925, and the 
revised one of 1941, the people were strictly prohibited 
from criticizing the Emperor. So, even though the number of 
these cases was still very small, the fact that those who 
dared to criticize the Emperor appeared, and the quality of 
29Fuj iwara, Showa 20, 87. 
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the criticism was getting more serious was important. 
Konoe also told Kido that he occasionally heard the remarks 
critical of the Throne. 3° Kido and Konoe shared the same 
feeling that the Imperial System was threatened not only 
from outside but also within the nation. 
(3) Army Officer Tanemura was concerned about the anti-
war sentiment. Not only civilian officials, like Kido and 
Konoe, but also Army officers, like Colonel Tanemura, were 
concerned about the antiwar sentiment among the people. He 
recorded that: "Anti-war, anti-military, and anti-government 
sentiments permeate among the intellectuals. This is a sign 
of a period near the end of war." This recognition of Army 
men that people wanted to get out of war worked as a 
demoralizing factor for them. 
(4) Professor Nambara visited important people to ask 
for peace. Professor Nambara and his colleague, Professor 
Takagi, visited military officers' offices and the Imperial 
Palace several times and offered their advice concerning the 
termination of the war. The Emperor recorded in his memoir 
Nambara•s advice regarding the way to end the war. 
Considering the fact that later the Emperor did what Nambara 
recommended and what Nambara advised was reflected on the 
Imperial Rescript for the termination of the war, his advice 
was considered to be quite influential. On June 8, Nanbara 
visited Rear Admiral Takagi's office. Takagi was Navy 
3°Kido, July 12, 1945. 
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Minister Yonai Mitsumasa's secretary, and under Yonai's 
command Takagi was studying the measures for the termination 
of the war since 1944. Nambara told him that: 
If Japan plunged into the battle of "one hundred 
million suicides" on the Japanese homeland, people 
will get angry at the Emperor, for he allowed it 
to happen. Also, if the Allies found that the 
Emperor was not useful for avoiding bloodshed, 
they would give up using the Emperor for the 
purpose of pacifying the Japanese military men and 
people. These internal and external factors would 
eventually undermine the Imperial System. The 
Soviet Union would exploit such a Japanese 
situation for the opportunity to spread communism 
into Japan. I would rather recommend the Emperor 
to proclaim that he would save the people from the 
suffering of the war, and bring peace to the 
world. Only in this way, he would maintain the 
respect of the people toward him, and restore his 
credibility in the international community. 
Already the morale of the people was very rapidly 
deteriorating. 31 
Nambara stood between the people and the Emperor, and inter-
preted the mind of the people for the Emperor. 
By the summer of 1945, already more than three million Japa-
nese people died at the battle fields and homeland. This 
was already enough for the people. If the Emperor had 
forced the people to suffer more, the people would have lost 
faith in him and begun to rebel against him. The internal 
crisis for the Imperial System was as serious as the 
external crisis. 
John W. Dower indicates in his book entitled War 
Without Mercy that people ,in America during the war were not 
aware of the crumbling Japanese situation. He says that 
31Takagi, Memoir, 282. 
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many Americans were surprised when the Japanese surrendered 
so soon after the atomic bombing. 32 If the American people 
had known the fact that the Japanese people were suffering 
from the agonies of the war, and the Japanese leaders were 
considering an end to the war, they would not have thought 
that the atomic bombing alone ended the war. 
33John W. Dower, War Without Mercy; Race and Power in 
the Pacific War (New York; Pantheon Books, 1986), 54. 
CHAPTER III 
JAPANESE CONCERN ABOUT THE SOVIET ENTRY 
INTO THE WAR WITH JAPAN 
Even though the May 8th German def eat was anticipated 
by the Japanese leadership ever since the Allied landing on 
Normandy, when it happened, they realized that it made the 
Japanese war effort tremendously difficult. Army Colonel 
Tanemura wrote in his office diary on May 1st, "Even though 
we are not surprised at the news of the German defeat, 
however, the situation surrounding Japan has become very 
serious. Now we must fight against all the world. " 1 The 
biggest concern for the Japanese after the German def eat was 
whether the Soviet Union would remain neutral in the Pacific 
War. From May 11 to May 14, the Supreme War Council met 
responding to the new international situation, and the first 
and foremost agenda for the meeting was Russian problems. 
The Japanese government and military leaders knew that the 
Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Treaty of 1941 was signed from 
expedient and advantageous reasons for each side. Once 
Russians completed the war in Europe, they had no need to 
remain neutral in the war between Japan and the Allies. The 
1Tanemura, May 1, 1945. 
59 
Japanese feared the Soviet entry into the war in East Asia 
so much that if it were to happen, they thought that the war 
would be over for the Japanese. 
Tojo's Fear of the Soviet Entry 
On July 18, 1944, when Tojo resigned from the 
premiership, Colonel Tanemura recorded Tojo's biggest 
concerns in the war: 
The Japanese war situation would become critical 
in two possible circumstances: when the Japanese 
Navy and Army began to conflict with each other; 
and when the Soviets began to join the war against 
Japan. 2 
Tanemura explained that even though Tojo was thought by the 
people to be adictator, actually he was so subservient to 
Navy leaders that he could not interfere in Navy matters, 
and this was the cause of his fall from his post. In the 
same way Tojo had a fear that some day the Soviet Union 
would begin to attack Japan. Tojo was not the only person 
who feared a possible Russian attack in the north; other 
military and government leaders shared the same feeling. 
There were several reasons to explain the Japanese fear of 
the Soviets. 
Nomonhan Incident 
A Japanese Army division was nearly annihilated by 
Russian armed forces lead by General Georgi K. Zhukov in the 
battle fought along the Mongolian-Manchurian border from May 
2Ibid., July 18, 1944. 
to August 1939. In the battle, about 18,000 Japanese Army 
officers and soldiers died. 3 The main cause of this 
disaster was that the Soviet Army was equipped with 
mechanized modern weapons. The Soviet troops were totally 
different from the time of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. 
The battle of Nomonhan left among Japanese military men a 
sense of inferiority toward the Soviet Army. One of the 
Japanese officers commented that European nations that 
fought World War I developed arms and means of war during 
the war, while Japan was left alone keeping old weapons. 4 
This fighting over a border dispute did not develop into a 
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war, but resulted in a neutrality treaty between the Soviet 
Union and Japan in April 1941. At this time, Japan had a 
hard time in the war in China and had decided to advance to 
South-East Asia. The Soviets needed such a treaty, too, 
because World War II had started in Europe and they had to 
deal with the difficult situation there. Learning a lesson 
from this bitter experience, the Japanese military began to 
modernize its weapons, though time and resources were not 
enough for the Japanese to catch up with the level and pace 
of the Russian and American production of arms. 
Also, the Japanese Army maintained the mind-set which 
3Taniguchi Katsuhisa, Noro-kochi Dokudan-tettai: 
Nomonhan no Hiroku [Retreat without Order from Noro 
Highland: Secret Records about Nomonhan Incident] (Tokyo: 
Oshisha, 1986), 206. 
4Ibid. 
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had become the cause of the failure at Nomonhan all through 
the Pacific War. At Nomonhan, in late June 1939, the 
Japanese Army leaders in Manchuria ignored the words of 
caution from Colonel Doi, the military attache in Moscow, 
about the imminent Soviet offensive, on the ground that 
negative views must not be allowed to dampen the field 
army's ardent resolve to smash the Soviet-Mongolian forces 
once and for all. Alvin D. Coox, the author of the book 
entitled Nomonhan says that it was apparent that the 
Japanese army did not know and did not want to know about 
enemy capabilities. It tended to twist reality to fit its 
preconceptions and could not or would not accept evidence to 
the contrary. 5 In the Pacific War, the Army leaders 
irresponsibly continued to make the same mistake. 
Emperor's Concern about the Soviets 
On July 22, 1944, Koiso Kuniaki and Yonai Mitsumasa 
formed a cabinet after Tojo's resignation. When these two 
men visited the Emperor after the formation of the cabinet, 
the Emperor told these men that they should never provoke 
the Soviet Union so that Japan could concentrate on the war 
with the Allies. 6 Considering the close relation between 
the Emperor and Tojo, it is likely that the Emperor shared 
5Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia. 1939 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1985), 
1,086. 
6Hosokawa, July 22, 1944. 
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Tojo's opinion that if the Soviet Union were to enter the 
war against Japan, the continuation of the war would become 
very difficult, or impossible. 
Why, at this time, did the Emperor and Tojo begin to 
express their concerns about possible Soviet attacks on 
Japan? Already in the previous year, Soviet armed forces 
defeated Germans in the Battle of Stalingrad and were making 
great westward advances toward Berlin. In June 1944, 
western Allies succeeded in landing on Normandy, and they, 
too, were advancing toward Germany. The prospect of the 
German def eat in Europe was becoming clearer to everyone in 
Japan. In the Pacific theater, the Allies had already 
broken the Japanese absolute defense parameters, and in 
July, the United States armed forces defeated the Japanese 
forces on the island of Saipan. The Emperor wanted to avoid 
a two-front war that had sealed the fate of Germany. 
Southern Sakhalin and Manchuria to the Soviet Union 
Earlier, on April 29, 1944, Colonel Tanemura, the chief 
of the Bureau for the Direction of the War in the General 
Staff Office, proposed a policy for avoiding possible Soviet 
entry into the war against Japan: 
To avoid the war with the Soviet Union, Japan 
should be ready to concede everything that the 
Soviets would demand. For that purpose Japan 
could hand over to Russia these territories: 
Manchuria, Liaodong Peninsula, Southern Sakhalin, 
Taiwan, Ryukyu Islands, Northern Curil Islands, 
and Korea. For this purpose, Japan could return 
to the condition before the 1894 Sino-Japanese 
War. Then, we can rebuild our nation again from 
the beginning. 7 
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Tanemura was a leading planner in the Army for the battle in 
the homeland. He considered that the Soviet neutrality was 
absolutely necessary for the Japanese fighting in the 
homeland. On September 15, 1944, Tanemura recorded that 
Foreign Minister Shigemitsu proposed to the Supreme War 
Council a great concession to the Soviet Union if it became 
obvious that the Soviets would join the war against Japan. 
Shigemitsu considered that the Japanese should concede 
Manchuria and Southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union in the 
worst case. Tanemura advocated the Foreign Ministry's 
proposal and commented that the critical war situation 
necessitated such discussion as to future Japanese 
concessions to the Soviet Union and possible peace 
negotiation with the Chiang Kai-shek government. 8 These 
concerns about the future Soviet attitude toward Japan 
indicated unreliability of the Neutrality Treaty of 1941. 
On September 18, only three days after this Supreme War 
Council that deliberated the measures for dealing with the 
Soviet Union, the Soviet Union sent a message to the 
Japanese government refusing to receive a Japanese 
plenipotentiary. Tanemura commented in his diary that the 
7Haisen no Kiroku, 347, cited in Nishijima Ariatsu, 
Genbaku wa Naze Otosaretaka [Why was the Atomic Bomb 
Dropped?] (Tokyo: Aoki-shoten, 1985), 183. 
8Tanemura, September 15, 1944. 
Japanese had already lost their military power to back up 
this kind of diplomatic activity. 9 Probably this is 
Tanemura's private opinion in the diary about the futility 
of diplomatic activity toward Moscow. He pointed out an 
important aspect of wartime diplomacy, especially when 
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dealing with the Soviets. Actually, a proposal of sending a 
Japanese plenipotentiary to Moscow arose again the next 
year, and this diplomatic effort became one of the causes of 
the delay in the process of ending the war. This problem in 
dealing with the Soviets reveals Japanese weakness in 
coordinating military and diplomatic activities. 
Stalin's Anti-Japan Speech 
On November 7, 1944, for the anniversary of the Russian 
Revolution, Stalin made a speech, calling Japan an aggressor 
nation in the ongoing war. Up to that day, Stalin had never 
referred to Japan in his speeches presumably respecting the 
neutrality treaty. However, for the first time he talked 
about the problems of Japan in the war. This great change 
on the part of the Soviet Union surprised the Japanese in 
every field. Stalin said: 
Aggressors always prepare better beforehand than 
the nations that are invaded. Reviewing the 
Japanese first attacks at Pearl Harbor, other 
Pacific islands, Hong Kong, and Singapore, the war 
in the Pacific was started by Japan. Japan, as an 
aggressor had prepared far better than such peace 
loving nations as the United States and Great 
9Tanemura, September 18, 1944. 
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Britain. 10 
Responding to this news, there were three opinions in the 
Japanese government: First, Prime Minister Koiso should make 
a responding statement. Second, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu 
should do so. Third, the government should ignore it. 
Then, Konoe's advice of no comment prevailed. 11 It is not 
known why he advised this way. In retrospect, it might have 
been much wiser if the Japanese government had investigated 
Stalin's real intention and the background of this speech. 
The Japanese Army evaluated Stalin's speech quite 
realistically. Vice Army Chief of Staff Hata reported to 
the Supreme War Council his estimation of Stalin's 
intention: 
We have been concentrating on the war with the 
United States, and as a natural consequence, 
Manchuria is today very poorly def ended against 
possible Russian attacks. Since Russia today 
finds no benefit in the Neutrality Treaty with 
Japan, it is no wonder even if Russia abrogates 
it. Generally, for dictators, treaty and war are 
two different things. We should not assume that 
the Neutrality Treaty will continuously assure us 
the security it has promised. 12 
On November 15, just the day before Hata made this report to 
the Council meeting, he had received news of an ominous 
event that occurred on this day at a Siberian railway 
station. Lieutenant Colonel Kaneko, who had left Tokyo with 
10Tanemura, November 9, 1944. 
11Higashikuni, November 16, 1944. 
12Tanemura, November 16, 1944. 
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a new code, was found dead there. Although his bag with the 
code was returned to the Japanese embassy, the code was 
probably copied by Russian intelligence officers. Men at 
the Army Staff Office in Tokyo were stunned at the news. 
Since Hata had long been stationed in the Soviet Union, he 
told his subordinates that: 
According to the Russian way of dealing with other 
nations, this blatant affair is the sign of 
Russia's intention to sever diplomatic relations. 
I have observed that similar things occurred in 
the Baltic States before relations with the Soviet 
Union worsened. 13 
From his experience in Russia, he was able to predict that 
Stalin would abrogate the Neutrality Treaty. However, in 
these statements of Hata's, we do not find the measures by 
which the Japanese Army would respond to the possible Soviet 
attacks if they were ever to happen. 
Response to the Yalta Conference 
A summit meeting of three Allied nations was held at 
Yalta from 4 to 11, February 1945. In this conference, 
problems related to both Germany and Japan were discussed. 
However, the agreement by the United States and the Soviet 
Union regarding Soviet entry into the war against Japan was 
kept secret. Because of the secrecy of this agreement, 
while the Japanese harbored anxiety about possible Russian 
attacks against them, they continued to try to ask the 
Soviets to keep the Neutrality Treaty. Colonel Tanemura 
13Tanemura, November 15, 1944. 
67 
recorded on February 9, that there was a radio broadcast 
which announced the news of the Yalta Conference of the 
three Allied leaders, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Churchill, and 
Stalin. They talked about the occupation of Germany, the 
economic organization to secure world peace. Tanemura 
noticed there was nothing about Japan in this broadcast. 
The absence of the article concerning Japan puzzled the 
Japanese. 
On April 5, the last day of the Koiso cabinet, 
notification was given by the Soviet Union that it would not 
be able to renew the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Treaty. 
Considering this matter and Stalin's speech in November 
which accused Japan of being an aggressor, Foreign Minister 
Togo was suspicious about the agenda in the meeting at 
Yalta. So he instructed Ambassador Sato to obtain an 
assurance from the Soviet Union concerning the Soviets' 
intentions toward Japan. Later Togo received a message from 
Sato telling him that on April 27, Molotov assured him that 
the attitude of the U.S.S.R. regarding maintenance of 
neutrality had not altered. 14 Molotov told a lie to hide 
the Yalta agreement with the United States. His tactics of 
deception were effective for biding time for the preparation 
of their attack on the Japanese forces in Manchuria by 
14Togo Shigenori The Cause of Japan (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1956), 279, translated and edited from Jidai 
no Ichimen (Tokyo, 1952) by Togo Fumihiko and Ben Bruce 
Blakeney. 
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keeping Japanese politicians and military men unaware of 
real Russian intention. 
On June 7, Rear Admiral Takagi received a telegram on 
the possible Russian entry into the war against Japan from a 
Military attache in Switzerland. It said: 
At the Yalta Conference, Stalin offered 
Roosevelt Russian entry into the war against 
Japan, and Roosevelt accepted it not from urgent 
necessity but for promoting the policy of 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. 15 
Takagi does not mention whether this message was 
communicated to the Foreign Ministry, and other government 
agencies. It seems that the government and the Staff Office 
did not pay worthy attention to this message from a Navy 
officer in a foreign land. 
Eastward Movement of the Red Army 
Contrary to Molotov's "assurance", the Japanese border 
guards were reporting a large concentration of Soviet Armed 
forces in Siberia to the General Staff Off ice in early 
April. They observed that the Soviet Army began to 
transport some divisions and a considerable number of planes 
and tanks eastward in Siberia. Tanemura recorded in the 
Staff Office diary on April 16, that it was then necessary 
to estimate the time of the Soviet entry into the war 
against Japan and decide how the Japanese Army would 
15
Takagi, Sokichi, Takagi Kaigun Shosho Oboegaki [Rear 
Admiral Takagi's Memoir] June 7, 1945 (Tokyo: Mainichi-
shinbunsha, 1979), 269; hereafter cited Takagi, Memoir. 
Takagi was a secretary to Navy Minister Yonai. 
respond. 16 Lieutenant Colonel Asai Isamu, Army Attache, 
left Moscow on April 27, traveled all along the Siberian 
Railway to Manchuria to investigate the transportation of 
Soviet Army men and arms. Vice Army Chief of Staff Hata 
received his message: 
I observed 12 to 15 trains per day carrying men 
and arms of the Red Army to Eastern Siberia. 
People appear to be starting a war very soon. I 
can tell that today Russian entry into the war 
with Japan is unavoidable. 17 
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On May 14, Colonel Matsutani, who was appointed secretary to 
Prime Minister Suzuki in April 1945, reported the size of 
the Soviet forces on the Manchurian border to Matsudaira, 
secretary of Marquis Kido: 
In late June, the Soviets on Eastern Siberia 
will have approximately 2,000 planes and 2,000 
tanks, and in July and August, additional planes 
and troops will arrive from Europe. We have no 
means to avoid catastrophe from Russian entry into 
the war. 18 
Matsudaira did not necessarily consider this situation 
pessimistically, but he thought that Russian threat could be 
used as an alarm to bring home to everyone the necessity to 
end the war. 
Army's Response to the Soviet Threat 
Tanemura recorded that on May 5, the Army Staff Office 
16Tanemura, April 16, 1945. 
17
Kanto-gun (2) [Kwantung Army], 324, cited in Tanaka, 
Dokyumento Showa Tenno, 208. 
18Takagi, Memoir, 233. 
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drafted a plan for defending Manchuria from possible Soviet 
invasion. He described a split of opinions in the Army: 
Some insisted that we should def end against the 
Soviets by maintaining our forces along the 
Manchurian-Soviet border, even if chances of 
victory would be tenuous. Others insisted that 
since it was likely that we could not defend 
Manchuria from Russian invasion, we should retreat 
as far south as the Manchurian-Korean border and 
secure Korea, the important part of the Japanese 
Empire. Finally, both sides compromised and 
decided that we would concentrate our forces in 
the Southern Manchuria and engage in a great 
protracted war. Four divisions were to be 
transferred from China to Manchuria. Some teams 
of troops have already begun to move according to 
this policy. 19 
Since this is a diary for the Staff Office, not for outside 
readers, Tanemura honestly recorded the attitude of the Army 
against the imminent Soviet invasion. The Japanese Army 
knew that in Manchuria they did not have enough strength to 
fight against the Soviets. The best parts of the armed 
forces had been already transferred to the Pacific. The Red 
Army that had just defeated Germany was turned this time 
toward the Japanese, and the momentum they had picked up in 
Europe was still lasting. It seems that by this time the 
Japanese Army did not have any prospect of victory in 
Manchuria. 
Prince Higashikuni 
In wartime Japan, it was not only military men who were 
worried about possible Soviet entry into the war with Japan. 
19Tanemura, May 5, 1945. 
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Prince Higashikuni, as a member of Imperial Family, feared 
Soviet advance in East Asia. He knew that communism is 
incompatible with the Imperial System, and that the Soviet 
advance and occupation of Japan, if it were to happen, meant 
to the Japanese the end of the Imperial System. On February 
12, 1945, Higashikuni fearfully described the Soviet advance 
in Europe: 
In the morning, Arimatsu, an officer of the 
General Staff Office came to me and said: 
Presently, the Soviet Army has advanced as far as 
about sixty miles east of Berlin. The German 
factories in Silesia were confiscated by the 
Russian forces without any destruction. The 
Germans are concentrating their forces in the east 
front and the Russians are sending reinforcements 
to the west. They have already established 
communist governments in Poland, Finland, and 
Bulgaria, and had infiltrated into France and 
Italy. The Soviet Union is now politically 
conquering the entire Europe. 20 
Higashikuni wrote this diary, worrying about the future of 
East Asia. Once the Soviets were to enter the war in East 
Asia, the same thing would happen there. The Soviet Union 
was contiguous to Manchuria and Korea, so East Asia could be 
tomorrow's "East Europe." If the Soviets were to enter 
Japan, the Imperial Throne would be far more in jeopardy 
than in the case American forces were to occupy the Japanese 
homeland. By this time, some people in Japan, especially 
people in the Imperial Court were probably weighing the 
possibilities of Soviet and American landing on the Japanese 
homeland. 
20Higashikuni, February 12, 1945. 
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Army's Response to Soviet Move 
On April 18, Tanemura recorded that in the Army 
Headquarters, Major General Nishimura walked around the Army 
off ice busily and coordinated the opinions of the Army 
concerning the measures for dealing with the Soviet move in 
East Asia. In this diary, Tanemura revealed that: In 
Nishimura's first draft of the Army's basic policy, there 
was an article, "Through the Soviet mediation, we will end 
the war." Then, after deleting it, the final draft became 
"We will implement sweeping measures for dealing with the 
Soviet Union." Tanemura was not certain whether the 
intention of the Army leaders was maintaining the neutrality 
of the Soviet Union, or ending the war through the Soviet 
mediation. 
There was a background story to this hesitation on the 
part of the Army leaders. Two days before, on April 16, at 
the Supreme War Council for discussing the basic war policy, 
Navy Minister Yonai rather abruptly asked, "Do we not mean 
by the basic war policy today bringing peace to the war?" 
The Army representatives only answered that the basic war 
policy included important questions. Since saving face was 
very important to them, they could not tell the Navy leaders 
that they were considering the termination of the war. The 
Army leader, General Umezu asked Prime Minister Suzuki to 
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present a proposal regarding the Soviet continued neutrality 
and cooperation in ending the war at the next meeting. 21 It 
seems that Yonai tested the intention of the Army leader by 
such a question, and he understood that even though Umezu 
was contemplating the termination of the war, he was unable 
to publicly announce his opinion, presumably considering 
roaring opposition to the idea within the Army organization. 
Konoe's Response to the May 8 Event 
On May 9, the day after Germany surrendered, Konoe gave 
a message to Navy Minister Yonai telling him that he should 
consult with Prime Minister Suzuki and Marquis Kido over the 
immediate procedure for the termination of the war. In this 
message, Konoe said: 
If we change our policy from war to peace after 
having Russian interference or after the 
occupation of Japan by the Red Army, it would be 
too late. Because in that case, Russians would 
force us to have a communist government. I am 
most afraid of this point: The Japanese society 
today with some chaos from the war provides 
Russians with a good opportunity for communizing 
Japan. 22 
Konoe persistently voiced his opinion about the threat of 
communism over Japan in the confusion from the war. He was 
a politician who was able to integrate domestic and 
international political issues into his considerations. He 
had a strong sense that the central issue in Japan and in 
21Tanemura, April 18, 1945. 
22Takagi Sokichi, Shusen Oboegaki [Recollections of the 
Termination of the War] (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1948), 39. 
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the world in those days was a threat from communism. 
Konoe's advice struck Yanai quite significantly because he 
later often talked about the social chaos from the war and 
the necessity to end the war as soon as possible. In 1917, 
when Yanai was Military Attache in Moscow, he observed the 
Russian Revolution, so probably he had a good understanding 
of why, how, and when a social revolution would occur. He 
might have compared war-torn Russia in 1917 and Japan in the 
summer of 1945. Yonai's recognition of the need for the 
early termination of the war was important because as Navy 
Minister he could exert significant influence on the Army 
for the reorientation in the Army policy of continuing the 
war. So Konoe made a right political move toward ending the 
war in this new situation. 
Umezu•s Inspection Tour in China 
On May 28, the General Staff Office decided to 
concentrate Japanese armed forces in Northern and Central 
China. The Japanese primary concern in the Chinese 
continent shifted from the Chinese to the Russians. In the 
first week of June, Chief of Army Staff Umezu made an 
inspecting tour in Manchuria and Northern China and returned 
to Tokyo on June 9. He reported the defence conditions in 
Manchuria and Northern China to the Emperor. Umezu's report 
became one of several reasons the Emperor used in deciding 
to end the war. The Emperor's memoir describes his 
interview with Umezu: 
According to Umezu's report, all the Japanese 
armed forces in China today could be equal in 
strength to eight American divisions. He said 
that if ten American divisions land on China, they 
would easily defeat us there. He had never before 
talked like this without confidence. 23 
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This is a mysterious document. The concern of the Japanese 
Army in China and Manchuria in those days was possible 
attacks from the north by the Soviet forces. The Emperor 
and Umezu might have discussed what the Emperor's memoir did 
not reveal. Umezu might have talked to the Emperor that 
substantial part of Army forces in Manchuria were withdrawn 
to the Pacific, thus the Japanese would not resist possible 
Soviet invasion. It is unlikely that Umezu went to Manchuria 
to inspect the defense against possible American invasion in 
this region. Furthermore, the Emperor certainly knew that 
the Soviets concentrated more than one million troops along 
the Manchurian border, which was more than ten American 
divisions. 
Yonai and the Army 
Navy Minister Yonai was carefully watching the change 
of the Army leaders, especially Chief of Staff Umezu and War 
Minister Anami, in their attitude toward the war and peace 
issue. On May 14, he said to his secretary Takagi that: 
... even though they cautiously keep silent, they 
are very afraid of Russian moves against Japan. 
They want the Soviet Union to confirm and extend 
the Neutrality Treaty, and to play a role of 
23Terasaki Dokuhakuroku, 13 7. 
mediation in the war. They are recently losing 
confidence in the war [in the Pacific and Asia] , 
and they want to end the war. 24 
It seems that Yonai was referring to the battle in Okinawa 
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when he talked about the confidence of the Army in the war. 
The Japanese Navy considered Okinawa as its final large 
battle, and used up most of its power there. As for the 
Army in Okinawa, on May 4, the Army engaged in a large scale 
counter offensive to recapture the bases American forces 
occupied, but it resulted in a miserable defeat. By this 
time the prospect of the battle in Okinawa was bleak to the 
Army leaders, and they were losing their credibility as well 
as their strength. The severity of the battle with very 
high casualty rates both for military personnel and 
civilians might have led the Army officials to estimate the 
war situation more realistically than before. In addition 
to losing the war in Okinawa, the May 8th German defeat 
staggered them even though they pretended not to pay 
attention to the fall of their European ally, and since that 
day the news of increased transportation of Russian armed 
forces to Eastern Siberia was reaching the Army Headquarters 
every day. The plan of the Army for fighting with the 
American forces on the Japanese homeland had been considered 
possible as long as the Soviets remained neutral. In the 
first place, the Japanese military was able to fight the 
Pacific war up to this day because the Soviets had been 
24Yonai Memoir, 107. 
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engaging a difficult war in Europe. The changing situation 
proved that the convenient treaty for both sides so far was 
becoming an empty promise. As a military leader, Yonai was 
able to see the factors which were undermining the Army's 
confidence beyond its ostentatious slogans. 
Togo and the Army 
Togo Shigenori, Foreign Minister when the Pacific War 
started in 1941, became Foreign Minister again on April 9, 
1945, pledging to end the war. He knew that the Army's 
insistence on continuing the war was the largest obstacle to 
peace. However, he found a breakthrough to this problem. 
He said: 
Early in my tenure of off ice the Vice-Chief of the 
Army General Staff, General Kawabe, called on me 
with some of his subordinates and, explaining in 
detail the concentration of the Red Army in 
Siberia, requested me to do all possible to 
prevent Russian participation in the war. The 
Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff, Admiral 
Ozawa, made a similar request, as did also the 
Army Chief of Staff, General Umezu. 25 
From this account, it is known that the Army had no other 
recourse than asking the Foreign Minister's help for 
avoiding the Russian entry into the war against Japan. It 
is hard to understand why the Army and the Navy thought that 
the Japanese Foreign Ministry possessed such power as to 
stop the war. Togo thought that this was a good opportunity 
to move for an early peace by making "use of the desires of 
25Togo Shigenori, The Cause of Japan, 279. 
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the military services." 26 Togo's objective was that in the 
process of approaching the Soviets for the assurance of the 
Neutrality Treaty, the Japanese would also ask the Soviets 
to mediate the war between Japan and the Allies. However, 
Togo himself did not think that at this juncture of the war, 
a diplomatic means would influence the war situation 
greatly. On May 16, Togo confidentially told Rear Admiral 
Takagi that diplomacy with the Soviet Union had many 
unpredictable elements, and in the ratio of 7 or 8 out of 
10, Russians would not give the Japanese a favorable 
response. 27 Togo's idea was that even if the odds were not 
favorable for Japan, still trying to approach the Soviets 
for the termination of the war would become one-step 
progress toward peace because now the most stubborn Army was 
at the table for the discussion over the subject of ending 
the war. 
Yonai's Work on the Army 
To bring the Army leaders to the line of the procedure 
of ending the war, Navy Minister Yanai played a role. At 
the Supreme War Council from May 11 to 14, though Umezu and 
Anami agreed to the proposal of asking the Soviets strict 
abiding to the Neutrality Treaty, and procuring further 
Russian favor, for example the Japanese buying Soviet 
26 Ibid., 280. 
27Takagi, Memoir, May 16, 1945: 236. 
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petroleum, they were reluctant to ask the Soviets' mediation 
on the ground that the time was too early to do that. 
However, at the Imperial Conference of June 22, Yonai 
proposed to start the request of Russians' mediation, 
considering the rapidly deteriorating Japanese domestic 
conditions as reported at the Imperial Conference of June 8. 
The Emperor showed a significant interest and asked the 
opinions of the Army leaders, Umezu and Anami. They did not 
oppose, though Umezu said that the implementation of this 
plan would need an utmost caution. 28 It seems that by this 
statement Umezu was implying the problems of the young 
officers in the Army who insisted on continuing the war. 
Since Yonai had known these circumstances in the Army, he 
utilized the authority of the Emperor with the cooperation 
of Kido and others in order to have the appearance that the 
Emperor urged the Army leaders to advance in the war ending 
process. 29 
Anami's Wish 
When Colonel Matsutani traveled to Kyushu with War 
Minister Anami in late May to inspect the defense conditions 
there, Anami confidentially talked to Matsutani that he was 
thinking about an early end to the war. In that case, Anami 
28Yonai, Memoir, 131. 
29Yonai, Memoir, 131. 
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could not tolerate the Japanese accepting miserable terms. 30 
The Army leaders remembered the way the Russo-Japanese war 
ended in 1905. At that time, the American President, 
Theodore Roosevelt, accepted the request to become a 
mediator. This time, the Japanese wished that the Soviet 
Premier Stalin would mediate the war in the Pacific. Just 
as their operations in the war were not always based on a 
realistic estimation of the situation, the Army leaders, 
expectation of a diplomatic solution of the war was not very 
realistic, either. 
Also, their expectation of the mediation by Russians 
was based on a misleading idea that the Soviet Union won the 
war in Europe because the Japanese abided by the Neutrality 
Treaty, and did not attack Russia during their war with 
Germany. 31 This time, it's Russians' turn to reciprocate 
favors. This is rather a naive way of looking at the 
international relations in war time. 
Kase Had a Doubt 
Foreign Ministry official, Kase Toshikazu, gave a 
message to Matsudaira, secretary to Marquis Kido: 
I have a doubt about asking Russians for 
mediation. This is like crossing a dangerous 
30Matsutani Makoto, Daitoa-senso Shuketsu no Shinso 
[The True Story of Ending the Japanese War] (Tokyo, 1984), 
147; hereafter cited Matsutani, True Story. 
31Togo, The Cause of Japan, 281. 
bridge. I think that theoretically the direct 
negotiation with the United States and Great 
Britain would be the best choice, but the Army 
would not allow it. So, I propose that as a trial 
we ask the Soviets first, and see how they 
respond. At the same time, we will prepare for 
the negotiation with the United States and 
Britain, and if the Russians do not respond 
favorably, then we will shift to the negotiation 
with the Americans and the British. 32 
Considering what Togo and Kase talked about in requesting 
Soviet mediation, it seems that this decision was rather 
dictated by the domestic military and political 
circumstances, that is, alternatives for the diplomatic 
solutions of the war was very much controlled by the 
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Japanese Army's preference. Just as the illusory promise by 
the Japanese military of victory at Okinawa was broken by 
American military force, the wishful expectation of Russian 
help in the war was to be crushed by Russian military force. 
Choice of Soviet Mediation 
Then, why did the Japanese choose Soviet mediation? 
The Army leaders thought that in that way they could save 
the Japanese military organization from the possibility of 
dissolution, because they knew that the American leadership 
had been strongly proclaiming the punishment of the Japanese 
militarists. Generally, Japanese politicians acquiesced to 
the idea that they could expect better terms through the 
good off ices of the Russian government than by direct 
negotiation with the United States and Great Britain. The 
32Matsutani, True Story, 14 8. 
Emperor talked about the choice of the Soviet Union for 
mediation in his dictated memoir: 
The reason we chose the Soviet Union for mediation 
was that we thought other nations were not strong 
enough to resist the United States' demand of 
imposing the unconditional surrender on Japan. On 
the other hand, the Soviet Union was a strong 
nation, and we thought that Japan and Russia had 
such a relationship as to enjoy the Neutrality 
Treaty. Since we did not trust the sincerity of 
the Soviet Union in dealing with other nations, we 
needed to proceed in this venture cautiously. 33 
The Emperor was worried about the United States demand of 
unconditional surrender because he thought that it might 
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include the abrogation of the Imperial System. So he wanted 
to resort to everything that would moderate these terms. 
When he said that the Soviet Union was a strong nation, it 
seems that he reflected his subordinates' expectation that 
the Japanese could exploit the increasing U.S. and U.S.S.R. 
confrontation, and the Soviets would need a neutral, strong, 
and friendly Japan. 
The Emperor's words of doubt about the sincerity of 
Russians indicated his concern about the possibility of 
Russian attack and advance in Manchuria and China. 
Certainly he shared a fear of communism with such people as 
Kido, Konoe, and Higashikuni who were intimately concerned 
about the future of Imperial Family. Expectation, doubt, 
and fear were all mixed up in this Japanese venture of 
asking the Soviets' mediation. The Emperor continued to say 
33Terasaki, Dokuhakuroku, 141. 
in his memoir: 
As the first attempt to approach Russians, 
Former Prime Minister Hirota met Russian 
Ambassador to Tokyo, Jacob A. Malik, with a deal 
that if Russia exported petroleum, Japan would 
concede to Russia such territories as Manchuria 
and Southern Sakhalin. Since Malik did not give 
any favorable answer to Hirota, I and the Japanese 
government decided to send Konoe to Moscow. Konoe 
accepted this mission, saying that he would even 
risk his life in this task. The Russian 
government responded to this request of accepting 
the Japanese plenipotentiary by saying that it 
would decide after Stalin and Molotov returned 
from the Potsdam Conference. However, Stalin did 
not give any reply, only, after a while Russians 
gave us the declaration of war on Japan. In this 
circumstance, we had no other way than accepting 
the unconditional surrender. 34 
Dealing with the Soviets was a difficult task, filled with 
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anxieties and suspicions. In the first place, the Japanese 
held a considerable suspicions about the Soviet intentions 
and moves. The Emperor and the government officials had 
heard the Russian preparation for entering the war against 
Japan. Then, why did they continue to depend on the Russian 
favor in ending the war? The main reason was that the 
leaders of the Japanese Army thought that this was the only 
way to get out of the war with their honor maintained, and 
that at the same time the Russian mediation of the war would 
become the best assurance to avoid the Soviet entry into the 
war against Japan. Also, the Emperor found his own interest 
in this deal with Russians. Other goverment officials 
considered that even though, for the moment, they yielded to 
34Terasaki, Dokuhakuroku, 141. 
the Army's demand of trying to procure Russian favor, this 
was an important approach to the termination of the war. 
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When the Red Army invaded Manchuria, the Kwantung Army, 
the pride of the Japanese Army, crumbled before the Soviet 
armed forces, and the Emperor had to yield to the Allies' 
demand of the unconditional surrender on the condition that 
the Imperial System would be intact. 
CHAPTER IV 
DEALING WITH THE JAPANESE ARMY 
By the summer of 1945, the Emperor and his chief 
advisors recognized that Japan did not have the strength to 
engage in a major battle with the Allied military forces on 
the homeland of Japan. Especially in early May by observing 
the destruction the Allied forces had inflicted on Germany 
and recognizing that the Japanese military had not been able 
to resist the United States armed forces in Okinawa, they 
thought that if the Allied forces were to land on the 
Japanese mainland, it would end up undermining the Japanese 
throne. The Japanese Army as a whole insisted on fighting 
to the last on the homeland, and imposed its plan on the 
government. Navy leaders Yanai and Takagi observed that 
generally Army leaders were losing confidence, but young 
Army officers maintained their posture to fight on, and they 
controlled the atmosphere of the Army, and also the 
government. Though the military power of the Army proved to 
be not sufficient to deal with the Allied armed forces, the 
power was strong enough to threaten and police the opponents 
of their war policy within the nation. 
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For those who thought that fighting on the homeland was 
not advantageous for the nation, it became important to 
maneuver the Army men into their position. Approaching the 
Soviets was one of the ways they tried for this purpose. 
Above all, the use of the authority of the Emperor was 
considered by many the best and final way to bring the 
nation to the termination of the war. Then, a question 
arises: Why did the Emperor definitely change his policy on 
the war in June 1945? Until that time, he maintained a 
belief that the Japanese military would win some kind of 
victory, if not a total victory, and that it would be 
advantageous for the Japanese to achieve better terms. 
Then, he came to want to end the war, because after 
observing the results of the military campaigns in Okinawa, 
he came to realize that already it would be impossible for 
the Japanese military to reverse the tide of the war. 
Moreover the surrender of Germany brought him to the reality 
of the power of the Allied nations. So, at this stage, the 
Emperor began to approach Konoe's position that the 
continuation of the war would not bring forth better terms, 
but rather endanger the throne. 
In early May, Kido reported to Konoe the change in the 
Emperor's attitude toward the military. Until that time the 
Emperor insisted on refusing the Allies' demands for 
punishing Japanese militarists and dissolving the Japanese 
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military, because he thought that Japanese disarmament would 
encourage Soviet advances on Japan. Kido said to Konoe that 
it took a long time for Kido to ''massage" the rigid 
Emperor's position of depending on the military's pledges. 
Even on this occasion of May, Kido was trying to persuade 
the Emperor saying that considering the international 
situation of that period, the weakened Japanese military of 
3,000 or 5,000 troops was not enough for the defense. 
Consequently the Emperor would no longer adhere to the 
position of defending the Japanese military in the process 
of bringing the war to the end. 1 Whether he wished or not, 
the Japanese Navy and Army were crumbling internally for 
their own reasons. In this communication between Kido and 
Konoe, Kido revealed that, probably from Konoe's influence, 
the Emperor and Kido were aware of the American demand for 
the Japanese disarmament, and that Kido had been trying to 
persuade the Emperor into his separation from the military 
as a means to facilitate the process of ending the war. 
Also, if the Emperor had thought that the Japanese military 
was necessary to defend Japan from Soviet incursion, and 
then gave up this idea, what alternatives for the defense of 
Japan from the Soviet threat did he and Kido have in their 
minds? Asking for the solid Soviet neutrality would be one 
1Takagi, Memoir, May 13, 1945: 228; Hosokawa, May 24, 
1945. 
of the answers. Also, like Konoe, Kido was thinking of 
approaching the United States. However, before doing that 
Soviet neutrality had to be tested. 
Even though there was a change in the Emperor's 
attitude toward the course of the war in May and June of 
1945, why was he unable to end the war quickly? Besides 
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the Soviet factor, we need to think about the relation 
between the Emperor and the Army men. The Emperor's 
advisors, especially Marquis Kido Koichi, considered the 
element of timing was important for such important Emperor's 
order to the nation. The memory of the attempted coup 
d'etat in 1936 by young Army officers was still vivid in the 
minds of everyone. Colonel Matsutani Makoto wrote later 
that during the last weeks of the war the question of how to 
deal with the problems of the Japanese Army became more 
difficult and important than dealing with the Allied 
attacks. 2 
Fighting on the Homeland 
According to Tanemura's diary, the idea of fighting on 
the Japanese homeland emerged when the Army Staff Off ice 
decided to give up the land fighting at Leyte on December 
19, 1944. Even though the Japanese Army still held out in 
2Matsutani, True Story, 161. 
the Philippines, the emphasis of the Japanese defense 
shifted from the Pacific islands to the Japanese homeland. 
As long as the Japanese were determined to continue to 
fight the war to the last, fighting on their homeland was 
inevitable. 
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Those in the Army who planned the fighting on the 
homeland explained the advantages of carrying the fighting 
home. Above all, enemy forces would have a much longer 
supply line in the Pacific Ocean. The Army planners 
overlooked the technological advance in the American air 
transportation. In addition the Japanese knew the terrain 
and climate of their home country; Japan still maintained 
plenty of human resources, and the morale of the people was 
expected to be heightened for the defense of their mother 
land. On June 6, 1945, Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori 
talked to Rear Admiral Takagi, criticizing these reasons the 
Army planners enumerated for their strategy. He mentioned 
that the Army did not take into its consideration prevalent 
destruction inflicted on the Japanese by the American air 
raids. Moreover, the morale of the people was 
deteriorating. The international situation for Japan became 
worse, and diplomatic solution of the war became harder. It 
is interesting that Togo, as a seasoned diplomat, see the 
war situation more realistically than the Army planners. 
Probably from the long tradition of the Japanese military, 
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the Japanese Army men had a tendency to consider the 
military plan in terms of ground operation, and 
underestimated the element of superior American air power, 
which made a very long distance of the Pacific Ocean a much 
lesser problem. Also, it was possible that the Army men 
admitted in their heart their weakness of not being able to 
deal with the American air raids, but they did not do so, 
because admitting their weakness meant to them admitting 
defeat and losing face. 
Takagi added the deteriorating situation in Okinawa to 
Togo's opinion. 3 In this conversation, Takagi reviewed the 
battle of Okinawa in relation to the planned battle in the 
mainland of Japan. If the Americans were to land on the 
homeland, the disasters in Okinawa would be repeated in much 
larger scale there. On May 16, Takagi had heard from Army 
Colonel Sato that the Japanese forces in Okinawa would fall 
in two weeks, and that the planned battle in the homeland 
would also become a very serious and difficult one. 4 Here, 
Takagi indicates that there were some officers in the Army 
who were seriously concerned about continuing the war after 
the situation in Okinawa became critical. Since the Army 
plan for fighting on the homeland was already made early in 
3Takagi, Memoir, 267. 
4 Ibid., 238. 
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1945, Colonel Sato did not say anything to oppose the Army 
decision, but it is likely that in his mind the idea of 
fighting on the homeland became more unrealistic after the 
battle of Okinawa. From the start, the Army plan of 
fighting on the homeland lacked substantial conditions that 
assured victory or safety of the people. The battle of 
Okinawa revealed to the Japanese what fighting on the 
homeland would look like and what consequences it might 
have. 
Even before Okinawa, there were people who criticized 
the government's and the Army's plan to make the homeland a 
battlefield. Earlier, on March 7, 1945, Admiral Okada 
criticized Prime Minister Koiso's defense plan against the 
future American landing. He talked to Takagi: 
Prime Minister Koiso says that if 10 American 
divisions were to land on the Japanese homeland, 
20 Japanese divisions will deal with them. People 
are now laughing at his idea saying that he should 
know how the Allied forces landed on Normandy. 
Americans have air superiority, so they will 
destroy our supply and communication lines 
completely. Since we have many rivers, they will 
destroy the bridges to obstruct the concentration 
of troops. Even if we have 50 divisions of 
troops, where shall we find weapons to give them? 
Here and there, Koiso talks to people that we will 
win, so they doubt about his sanity of thinking . 
... A remark of Army Chief of Staff that the 
battle in the Philippines will turn out to be our 
victory is perplexing to everyone. 5 
Prime Minister Koiso was an Army general, so his ideas 
5Takagi, Memoir, March 7, 1945: 168. 
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represented those of the Army. Okada, a Navy leader 
questioned the rationality of the Army plan of fighting with 
the American forces on the Japanese homeland. Already at 
this stage it was revealed to nearly everyone that the 
Japanese military was unable to defend the people in cities 
against the American air raids. In the Army plan, it seems 
that the Army planners interpreted "the landing of American 
forces on the Japanese homeland" as the landing of American 
soldiers on the Japanese land, overlooking the aid of 
American air power. Out of the 50 newly organized 
divisions, 25 divisions were to be deployed in the trenches 
along the coasts on the Pacific Ocean. Many of the soldiers 
in these trenches had bamboo spears, for only 700,000 rifles 
and only 23 percent of the required number of machine guns 
were available. Only a very small number of officers who 
were military school graduates were to train and direct 
these new soldiers. 6 Just the number of troops, two 
million, was astounding, enough to overwhelm the American 
leadership in Washington, but the substance of the Japanese 
defense for the homeland was amazingly poor. 
In the spring and summer of 1945, there were various 
kinds of episodes that exposed ridiculously poor conditions 
of the Japanese defense against the possible invasion of the 
~Teikoku Rikugun no Saigo (3) [The End of the Imperial 
Army], 150, cited in Tanaka, Dokyumento Showa Tenno, 144. 
homeland. The Governor of Kochi prefecture, Takahashi 
Saburo, talked to Marquis Kido: 
In our area, newly recruited soldiers are 
trained with cannons which are made of wood from 
the scarcity of iron. If the people hear about 
this story, their morale will be weakened. 7 
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Kido told this story to the Emperor. So probably this story 
together with other similar reports to him contributed to 
his reconsideration of the plan for fighting on the 
homeland. 
Japanese Navy leaders were well aware of the 
anachronistic ideas of thinking of Japanese Army men who 
remembered the days of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, when 
the spirited soldiers fought the land war with the Russian 
counterparts face to face on the fields of Manchuria. 
However rational the opinions of these Navy leaders were, 
they were not able to change the government plan of fighting 
on the homeland. The Army was still dominant having 
millions of soldiers, and the Emperor was still on the side 
of the Army plan at this stage. From the spring of 1945, 
such Navy men as Yonai and Takagi became more active 
politically to criticize the Army policy, to lead it to a 
more rational position, and together with Kido and Konoe to 
influence the Emperor to the direction of ending the war. 
7Shoda Tatsuo, Jushin-tachi no Showashi [Showa History 
of Senior Statesmen] (Tokyo: Bunshun-bunko, 1984), 367. 
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Emperor and Defense Conditions 
There is an episode that indicates the change of the 
relationship between the Emperor and the Army leadership. 
On June 3, 1945, the Emperor sent most of his Military Aide-
de-camps to the beach called Kujukurihama [ninety-nine-mile 
beach], about 40 miles south-east of Tokyo, for the purpose 
of inspecting the defense conditions of this area. As the 
name indicates, this beach was very long, having a wide and 
flat hinterland. From the nature of the terrain and 
proximity to Tokyo, it was considered that the American 
forces would land on this area. After the inspection, these 
men reported to the Emperor that they were hardly able to 
find any substantial defense in this area. Since they went 
on the inspection tour not long after Army Chief of Staff 
Umezu reported to the Emperor on the satisfactory defense 
conditions of this area, the credibility of the Army Chief 
sank. 8 Also, Umezu had made another report to the Emperor 
on the equipment of arms to the newly organized divisions 
for the defense of the homeland. Later the Emperor found 
from the other source that in actuality many soldiers had 
8Daihonei Rikugunbu (10) [General Staff Office, Army 
Department] (Tokyo: Asagumo-shuppan-sha, 1975), 449. 
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neither rifles nor bayonets. 9 From these cases, the Emperor 
found that up to that day he had been informed of only nice 
things about the Army. His order to his aides for the 
inspection of defense conditions after Umezu's report meant 
that the Emperor had begun to doubt about Army leaders' 
account on the national defense. These episodes signify 
that throughout the war the information to the Emperor 
concerning the operation of the war had been altered by the 
military to promote the Army's and Navy's interests and 
objectives. The recognition of the Emperor that he had not 
been always truly informed of the war situation motivated 
him to reconsider the continuation of the war. 
Anami's Inspection Tour in Kyushu 
In late May, 1945, War Minister Anami traveled to 
Kyushu to inspect the defense conditions in that area. 
Kyushu is the southernmost island among the four main 
islands of Japan. The Japanese considered that if the 
Americans were to invade Japan, Kyushu would be the first 
target for their landing. Colonel Matsutani accompanied him 
in this tour. What is curious about this tour is that Anami 
was a person who persistently insisted on continuing the war 
until the day before the ending of the war. On the other 
9 Ibid. 
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hand, Matsutani's position in the Army was that he was 
assigned to study about the time and measures for ending the 
war. After the tour, Matsutani informed Takagi that the War 
Minister felt in the tour that the defense of Kyushu against 
the possible invasion by American forces would be extremely 
difficult. 10 At this time, Anami told Matsutani that he 
would like to end the war if the Japanese were to be offered 
favorable terms. 11 The fact that Anami inspected the 
defense conditions of Kyushu in person, and had an 
impression that the Japanese defense of the homeland would 
become a difficult one is important. In the last days of 
the war, when young officers pleaded with him to pronounce 
his position of continuing the war by refusing to give a 
signature to the government document for ending the war, and 
by resigning from the cabinet post, he decided to join the 
side of peace, and after he was assured that the war would 
officially end, he committed suicide. In that difficult 
time of his decision, the inspection tour to Kyushu might 
have been one of the important factors for his decision. 
One Hundred Million Suicides War 
"Ichioku Gyokusai" is the original Japanese word for 
the term "one hundred million suicides war." The word 
10Takagi, Memoir, 257. 
11Matsutani, True Story, 147. 
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"gyokusai" literally means "a glass ball flying very fast 
hits a rocky wall and splashes away in tiny particles." The 
phrase is used as a rhetorical and proverbial expression 
meaning "If a person is forcefully determined without any 
hesitation, and go his way on and on, he will do it." 
The advocates of the Imperial System utilized the phrase as 
a slogan to encourage the people to dedicate their lives for 
the protection of the Emperor. This idea was emphasized so 
much that in actual wars the literal meaning of the term 
took the place of its rhetorical use. Many deaths of 
soldiers in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and the 
invention of Kamikaze-attackers were the examples of the 
implementation of this idea. 
In the spring and summer of 1945, those advocates of 
fighting on the homeland actually thought of imposing this 
idea of "one million suicides in the war" to protect the 
national polity, that is, the Imperial System. Lieutenant 
Colonel Ida Masataka used a legendary story in the history 
of Paraguay in South America when he tried to persuade 
Lieutenant General Mori Takeshi into coup d'etat for 
establishing a military government to prosecute a defense 
war on the homeland: 
In early 19th century, Paraguay fought a very 
harsh war, in which the President of the nation 
died in the battle, and the people died in the 
fighting until the population became a sixth of 
the original population. This is really an 
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example of pride of a nation. 12 
For Ida and his colleagues, this story was not just a 
legend, but a scenario according to which the Japanese 
should fight the war to the end. For this kind of fanatical 
idea not only these radical young officers were responsible, 
but also many people in the government shared the idea of 
fighting to death. For example, Prime Minister Suzuki 
Kantaro pronounced just before he became Prime Minister on 
April 5, 1945 that " today, we must, of necessity 
continue the war at any cost," and he emphasized the 
necessity "to die in action for His Majesty. Japanese 
Imperial wars were performed on the foundation of this idea, 
expending the lives of soldiers and people for the Emperor 
up until August 15, 1945. 
Konoe's Opposition to Fighting on the Homeland 
Former Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro persistently 
opposed the continuation of the war, especially the land war 
on the Japanese homeland, on the ground that the chaos in 
society from the war would become a hotbed for social 
revolution. On January 22, 1945, he said to Takagi: 
If Americans were to land on the Japanese mainland 
and we were forced to engage in a guerilla 
12 Ito Takashi, Hata Ikuhiko, Hando Kazutoshi, "Shusen 
to Waheikosaku no Nazo ni Semaru [Approaching the Riddle of 
Ending the War and Peace Move]" Gendai [Modern Period], 
September, 1995 (Tokyo: Kodansha), 60. 
warfare, it is the situation communists want to 
exploit very much. If we allow this kind of 
situation to happen, Japan will be in total chaos 
and the national polity would be in jeopardy. 13 
At this stage of the war, when most of the politicians 
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supported or passively followed the Army plan of fighting on 
the homeland on the ground that only in that way people 
could protect the Emperor and the nation, Konoe argued quite 
differently. He asserted that far from defending the 
Emperor, fighting in the homeland would rather put the 
Emperor in a dangerous situation. The Japanese society 
during the war was tightly controlled and regulated by the 
government and the military, in other proper words, the 
people were suppressed and forced to fight the war. If the 
American armed forces were to land on Japan and some parts 
of the Japanese police and military powers were to stop 
functioning, Konoe did not think that, in that situation, 
all the people still show their allegiance to the military 
government. He had some sources of information which 
indicated that in the spring and summer of 1945, there were 
some people who did not hide their anger at the Emperor over 
their suffering from the war. 14 
Konoe was most concerned about the communists' 
13Takagi, Memoir, January 22: 123. 
14Kido Koichi, Diary of Marquis Kido, 1931-45, July 12, 
(Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 
1984) . 
100 
influence on radical elements in the Army who insisted on 
the continuation of the war. On February 14, Konoe pointed 
out to the Emperor that since the majority of the Japanese 
professional military men "hail from families below the 
middle class, their whole environment of life has been such 
that it is easy for them to fall prey to Communist 
doctrine." So Konoe asserted that the earlier termination 
of the war would be more favorable, and for this purpose, 
the elimination of these radical elements in the Army was 
necessary. 15 
In spite of these concerns, in February 1945, Konoe's 
advice did not change the Emperor's idea about the 
continuation of the war. However, it is not right to say 
that the Emperor ignored or did not understand what Konoe 
said. At this time, the Emperor said that he had to still 
see the result of the battle of Okinawa, for the Army and 
Navy were willing to fight the battle. He wanted to have a 
victory before his government went to negotiation with the 
United States because he thought that it would assure him 
better terms for Japan. At the same time, this statement 
signifies that when the military had already begun to move 
for the preparation of the battle, it would be hard for the 
Emperor to stop the move. It seems that there was a gap in 
15Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, 48. 
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understanding the power of the Emperor in relation to the 
Army between the Emperor and Konoe. Konoe understood that 
the Emperor had the absolute power over the Army, and he 
should wield the power to change the course of the war. The 
Emperor thought that though it was supposed that he 
commanded the Army, it was not always so easy for him to do 
that. As Konoe talked to the Emperor, certainly the Emperor 
had power which no other person in Japan had. The problem 
was that the Emperor did not use the power to compel the 
Army to move in the direction the Emperor wished. Harada 
Kurnao was a secretary to Saionji Kinrnochi, one of the most 
influential politicians in modern Japanese history, and a 
long-time advisor to this Emperor. Harada was an intimate 
friend of Konoe. Later Konoe talked to Harada about this 
February 14th interview with the Emperor: 
I talked to the Emperor about my opinion of the 
Army. He told me that he also thought that 
something must be done with the problems of the 
Army, and asked me what he could do to solve the 
problems. I answered that since he knew best in 
the nation about the affairs of the Army, he could 
change the behavior of the Army by His Majesty's 
decisive orders. 16 
The February 14th interview in which Konoe's advice was 
given to the Emperor is famous for its influence on the 
direction of the war. However, generally the focus of 
interest has been directed by historians to the part of the 
16Takagi, Memoir, 181. 
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conversation in which the Emperor insisted on letting the 
Army and Navy fight the battle in Okinawa. It is 
interesting to find that on this occasion the Emperor 
honestly talked to Konoe about the problem he felt with the 
Army. This conversation reveals a delicate balance of power 
between the Emperor and the Army. The Imperial Constitution 
stipulated that "The Emperor has the supreme command of the 
Army and Navy," 17 and "The Emperor declares war, makes 
peace, and concludes treaties." However, the real power did 
not always come from the constitution, but from the person 
of the Emperor. A Japanese historian for modern Japan, Hata 
Ikuhiko, says that in the days when the Japanese Army and 
Navy were strong enough, there were some occasions when 
military leaders ignored what the Emperor told them, and the 
frustration of the Emperor accumulated. 18 
In discussing the relationship between the Emperor and 
the Army, it is necessary to talk about the role of Prince 
Saionji Kinmochi as a long-time advisor to the Emperor 
Hirohito before Kido. In his young days, from 1871 to 1880, 
Saionji studied European institutions and law in France. 
Later in his political activities he maintained a liberalist 
17Article 11, Constitution of the Empire of Japan, 
1889, cited in Japan: An Illustrated Encyclopedia, s.v. 
"Constitution" (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1993). The next article 
quoted here is Article 13. 
18Terasaki, Dokuhakuroku, 246. 
and anti-military stance. He said in 1937: 
A military man cannot really understand such 
matters as the welfare of a nation or a people. 
Military men advocate national unity, but their 
national unity is no unity at all. It just means 
submission to them. 19 
Even though he felt that the growing influence of the 
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military was a great problem for the nation, he thought it 
wise not to interfere into what the Army was doing in China 
in 1932, when there was a question whether the Emperor 
should caution Count Uchida for his acquiescing in the 
Army's aggression in North China. He said: 
If the Emperor cautioned him ... the Army leaders 
... would blame the Emperor's advisers and me. If 
the Army would not heed even the words of the 
Emperor, it would greatly impair his prestige. So 
it is a very delicate matter." 20 
In this way, he thought that it was necessary for him to 
arrange the delicate relationship between the Emperor and 
the Army, weighing the power of the Army at the time. He 
died in 1940, at the age of 92, worrying about the future of 
Japan. 
Concerning the start of the Pacific War in 1941, the 
Emperor recorded in his memoir that: 
When my brother, Prince Takamatsu advised me not 
19Harada Kumao, Saionj iko to Seikyoku, vol. 5, (Tokyo, 
1950-56), 265, cited in Encyclopedia of Japan (English 
Version) s.v. "Saionji Kin-mochi" (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1983). 
20Harada, vol.2: 420-21, cited in Encyclopedia of 
Japan, s.v. "Saionji Kin-mochi". 
to enter the war with the United States, I said to 
him that if I had not approved the war, the 
military would have started a coup d'etat. 21 
This Emperor's statement reminds us of Saionji's 
consideration about what the Emperor could do when the 
military was powerful. 
Kido's Approach 
104 
Kido became the Emperor's advisor after Saionji left, 
and like Saionji he cautiously dealt with the Army when it 
was strong. Even though he felt that the nation should move 
on to the termination of the war in the summer of 1944, he 
considered that before Japan decided to end the war, the 
nation would need to be attacked by air raids and landing of 
enemy troops to some degree so that the people would see the 
necessity of ending the war. 22 It seems that Kido used the 
word "the people" rather euphemistically, including the 
Japanese Army as its important component. At that time, 
Kido thought that even though the war situation was not 
favorable for Japan, the nation was still not ready to bring 
the war to its end, especially since the Army did not favor 
it. 
So between Kido and Konoe, there was a difference in 
their attitude toward the situation. For Kido, the Emperor 
21Terasaki, Dokuhakuroku, 8 9. 
22Hosokawa, June 26, 1944. 
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had to wait for the good opportunity to arrive. Since Kido 
met the Emperor almost everyday in the spring and summer of 
1945, it is likely that this attitude was also taken by the 
Emperor. On the other hand, Konoe said that if Kido and 
Prime Minister Suzuki agreed to bringing the war to its 
termination, and the Emperor decided in the same direction 
the Army would follow. 23 After observing the defeat of 
Germany, Kido began to move closer to Konoe's position. 
23Memo of Tomita, Konoe's secretary to.Takagi, May 
9, 1945, cited in Ososugita Seidan, 198. 
CHAPTER V 
APPROACHING THE END OF THE WAR 
In Japan, for those who thought that Japan had to end 
the war, the retention of the Imperial System was becoming 
the last thing they wished to defend. After the German 
surrender, in America, there were people who wanted to end 
the war with Japan by modifying the unconditional surrender 
terms, especially by giving the Japanese the assurance that 
they could keep the Japanese Emperor. Also in America, the 
completion of the atomic bomb was approaching. Those people 
in the American leadership who knew the secret project of 
producing the atomic bomb expected that the bomb would be 
used to end the war early. The Soviets were to enter the 
war three months after the German surrender according to the 
Yalta Agreement of February 1945, that was negotiated by 
President Roosevelt and Premier Stalin. 
American Intention Concerning the Emperor 
Konoe Fumimaro, former Prime Minister, and others who 
wanted an early end of the war had great concern about how 
the United States would treat the Japanese Emperor. 
Certainly, it was also the Emperor's concern. For him, the 
Japanese war effort was at that time no longer for the co-
prosperi ty of East Asia. He continued the war so that Japan 
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could end the war on better terms, that is, to preserve the 
national polity. Konoe understood this circumstance, and he 
thought that to lead the Emperor in the direction of ending 
the war, it was necessary to tell the Emperor the intention 
of the Americans regarding the future of the Japanese 
Imperial System. Earlier, in February, Konoe pointed out to 
the Emperor that "public opinion in America and Britain, on 
the whole, has not yet gone so far as to demand a 
fundamental change in our national structure." 1 Konoe 
probably did not know that in America, in early 1945, most 
of the people blamed the Japanese Emperor, and by "public 
opinion", he meant the opinion of some important government 
leaders. Konoe's use of the words "has not yet gone" is 
important because by these words he meant that "if the war 
was to continue further, they would change their attitude 
toward Japan." So, he advised the Emperor that an earlier 
ending of the war would be more advantageous. After this 
statement, Konoe talked about the fear of communism and 
Soviet expansion in the world. Considering this background, 
it is clear that Konoe's plan for ending the war was by 
direct negotiation with the United States. 
After observing the defeat of Germany, Marquis Kido 
Koichi, the adviser to the Emperor, became increasingly 
concerned that Japan might share the same fate as Germany, 
and that Japan might not be able to safeguard the Imperial 
1Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, 47. 
Household. On June 8, he drafted a proposal in which he 
stated that: 
Though it would perhaps be a good idea to initiate 
direct negotiations with the Anglo-Americans, who 
are our opponents, it would be more appropriate to 
have Soviet Russia, which is observing neutrality 
at present, act as our intermediary. 2 
When Kido proposed negotiation with the United States and 
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Great Britain, he said so because he perceived an indication 
from President Truman's statement on May 8, that the United 
States would only punish the militarists in Japan, and not 
the Emperor. 3 The President's statement was as follows: 
. . . Our blows [on the Japanese] will not cease 
until the Japanese military and naval forces lay 
down their arms in unconditional surrender. Just 
what does the unconditional surrender of the armed 
forces mean for the Japanese people? It means the 
end of the war. It means the termination of the 
influence of the military leaders who have brought 
Japan to the present brink of disaster. It means 
provision for the return of soldiers and sailors 
to their families, their farms, their jobs. It 
means not prolonging the present agony and 
suffering of the Japanese in the vain hope of 
victory. Unconditional surrender does not mean 
the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese 
people. 4 
In this statement, the President did not actually refer to 
the Japanese Emperor. The future status of the Emperor was 
still a controversial subject in the American government, 
specifically in the State Department, even though tacit 
agreement was reached between the President, Secretary of 
2Kido, June 8, 1945. 
3 Ibid. 
4New York Times, May 9, 1945, p6. 
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War Stimson, Secretary of Navy Forrestal, and Acting 
Secretary of State Joseph Grew. The President's silence on 
retaining the Emperor implied that he recognized the 
difference of opinion concerning this issue in the American 
government and among the people. Another important feature 
of this statement is that President Truman emphasized that 
it was not the American primary purpose to harm the Japanese 
people, and that America would rather like the Japanese 
people to return to a normal, peaceful life. This idea 
became the base of the July 26th Potsdam Declaration. 
Kido noticed that President Truman did not mention the 
Emperor, but only accused the Japanese military leaders. 
Kido's concern was not so much about the future life of the 
people as about the future status of the Emperor. Even 
though Kido did not mention anything about the Army in his 
temporary choice of the Soviet Union for negotiation, it is 
certain that the choice came from the consideration of the 
Army's strong request for saving its face. Also, since a 
certain section of the Army was listening to the American 
radio (that was proved at the time of the Potsdam 
Declaration), the Army men were aware that the negotiation 
with the United States would mean considerable punishment 
for the Army. 
The Japanese leaders thought that asking the Soviets 
for mediation was one of the options, and seeking direct 
negotiation with the United States was still reserved as an 
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alternative. This point is important because it was not 
necessarily the atomic bomb that caused the Japanese to 
attempt negotiation with the United States on the retention 
of the Emperor. In the case that the Soviet route were to 
be closed, the Japanese had an alternative plan to directly 
ask the United States for negotiation, and for this move, 
important figures in the leadership had already had an 
inkling of how the United States government would respond to 
Japanese requests. They based their calculations on what 
they learned from diverse sources of information, the most 
important of which was the May 8th statement by President 
Truman. 
Grew•s Concern about the Soviets' Advance in East Asia 
In considering the July 26th Potsdam Declaration, it is 
necessary to see the events in the American government which 
led to the necessity of such a declaration. In the early 
summer of 1945, some people in the United States government 
and military began to voice their opposition to the planned 
Soviet entry into the war against Japan. General Douglas 
MacArthur, Chief Commander of the United States Army in the 
Pacific theater, requested the Soviet help throughout the 
war, and Soviet Premier Stalin promised it to Secretary of 
State Cordell Hull in 1943. President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and Stalin reached a secret agreement on the Soviet entry 
into the Pacific War at the Yalta Conference in February 
1945. 
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Acting Secretary of State Grew became concerned about 
possible Russian infringement on the American interests in 
East Asia in the event of the up-coming Russian invasion of 
Manchuria. Representing the State Department, on May 12, 
Grew presented three important questions relating to the 
Russian entry into the war and American policies in East 
Asia: 
1. Is the Soviet entry so indispensable as to 
preclude political negotiation with Russia on the 
American interests in the East Asia? 
2. Is it impossible for the U.S. to re-negotiate 
with the Soviets on the revision to the Yalta 
agreements? 
3. Can Soviet occupation of Japan be avoided? Is 
it desirable to the U.S. interests in this area? 5 
Grew's questions reflected the opinion of many people in the 
U.S. government and military that the situation of the war 
with Japan came to the point where the United States would 
no longer need Soviet assistance to defeat Japan. His 
second question reflected the complaints of the people that 
at the Yalta Conference President Roosevelt gave too many 
concessions to Stalin in return for the Soviets' aid in the 
war with Japan. On the whole, these questions represented 
considerable concerns of the American leadership regarding 
the Soviet entry into the Pacific War scheduled three months 
after the German surrender according to the Yalta Agreement. 
Stimson answered these questions: 
5Memo, Acting Secretary of State Grew for Secretary 
Stimson, May 12, 1945, in The Entry of the Soviet Union into 
the War Against Japan: Military Plans. 1941-1945 (Washington 
D.C., 1955), hereafter cited Entry of Soviet Union. 
. . . Russian entry into the war against Japan will 
be decided by the Russians on their own military 
and political basis with little regard to any 
political action taken by the United States. 
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Stimson fully understood that the ulterior objective of the 
Soviets' aid in the Pacific War was for them to retrieve and 
acquire from Japan as much territory as they could in East 
Asia, especially to reverse the victory Japan won at the 
Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. So he indicated the 
impossibility of the political renegotiation of the Yalta 
Agreement. As for the possibility of the Soviet occupation 
of Japan, Stimson cited American "experiences with the 
Russians in the occupation of Germany" and pointed "to the 
wisdom of exclusive occupation" by American forces. 7 
Relating to this matter, Stimson said in this letter to Grew 
that American military strength in this area was enough to 
defeat Japan alone. Stimson probably meant that it would be 
advisable for the United States at this stage of the war to 
concentrate its forces on securing the earlier defeat of 
Japan before anyone else would try to reach Japan. 8 
In those days, Stimson was considerably concerned about 
the development of the atomic bomb. On May 13, 1945, the 
day after Stimson got Grew's memo, in his diary he related 
Grew's questions to the program of developing the atomic 
6Letter, Secretary Stimson to Acting Secretary Grew, 
May 21, 1945, cited in Entry of Soviet Union, 70. 
7 Ibid., 71. 
8 Ibid. 
bomb. 
These are very vital questions and I am very glad 
that the State Department has brought them up and 
given us a chance to be heard on them. The 
questions cut very deep and in my opinion are 
powerfully connected with our success with S-1 
[the atomic bomb] . 9 
In this diary entry, Stimson revealed a strong connection 
between the Soviet problems and the expected American 
possession of the atomic bomb. 
Discussion on Warning Announcement to the Japanese 
On May 29, Acting Secretary of State Grew called a 
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meeting of State, War and Navy Secretaries and their aides 
to discuss a planned warning announcement to the Japanese. 
It was Grew's idea that by giving the Japanese an assurance 
that the Japanese could keep the Emperor, the United States 
would bring the earlier termination of the war. 
This idea was strongly supported by Secretary of Navy 
Forrestal. After the Battle of Iwojima, he investigated the 
result of the battle on the island, and felt the necessity 
of stopping further bloodshed. Under his auspices, Captain 
Zacharias was to begin a series of propaganda broadcast 
toward Japan in the middle of May 1945, for urging the 
Japanese to end the conflict. 10 
Stimson recorded a significant diary entry about the 
9Stimson Diaries, May 13, 1945. 
10captain Ellis M. Zacharias, USN, Secret Missions: The 
Story of an Intelligence Officer (New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1946), 330. 
meeting: 
It was an awkward meeting because there were 
people present in the presence of whom I could not 
discuss the real feature which would govern the 
whole situation, namely S-1 [the atomic bomb] . 
. . . I told him that I was inclined to agree with 
giving the Japanese a modification of the 
unconditional surrender formula and some hope to 
induce them to practically make an unconditional 
surrender without the use of those words. I told 
him that I thought the timing was wrong and that 
this was not the time to do it. 11 
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The matter of the atomic bomb was top secret, and knowledge 
of it limited to only a few people. From this statement, it 
is certain that in Stimson's mind the atomic bomb and the 
issue of giving the Japanese a modified surrender formula 
were related. When Stimson said that "this was not the time 
to do it," he was thinking about the relation between the 
timing of the perfection of the atomic bomb and the timing 
of the modification of the surrender terms. 
July 2nd Stimson's Memo to the President 
On July 2, 1945, Stimson gave to President Truman a 
memo which incorporated basic ideas for the Potsdam 
Declaration of July 26. In the letter to Truman that 
accompanied the memo, Stimson mentioned that the ideas for a 
warning to Japan were the result of the discussion between 
Stimson, Grew, and Forrestal. Stimson stated that this 
warning to Japan would be revised when the efficacy of a new 
weapon was proved. So here, Stimson thought a combination 
11Stimson Diaries, May 29, 1945. 
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of a warning to Japan in the form of the Potsdam 
Declaration, and the power of a new weapon would bring Japan 
to its surrender. 
The July 2nd draft of the proclamation which was to be 
eventually delivered to the Japanese included the retention 
of the Emperor: 
The occupying forces of the Allies shall be 
withdrawn from Japan as soon as our objectives are 
accomplished and there has been established beyond 
doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible 
government of a character representative of the 
Japanese people. This may include a 
constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty 
if it be shown to the complete satisfaction of the 
world that such a government will never again 
aspire to aggression. 12 
The assurance of the retention of the Imperial System 
reflected Grew's strong opinion that this clause was vital 
for the acceptance of the proclamation by the Japanese. 
Deletion of the Emperor Clause 
The part of the proclamation that included the 
assurance of retaining the Japanese Imperial System was 
deleted by Secretary of State James Byrnes after he 
consulted with former Secretary of State Cordell Hull on 
July 16. Hull said in his letter to Byrnes: 
The proponents believe that this step 
[modifying the unconditional surrender terms] 
might shorten the war and save allied lives. The 
theory is that somehow the influences and persons 
12Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic 
Papers: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 
~ volume I (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1960), 894; hereafter cited .ERQ.S.. 
who listen to the Emperor and his religion would 
fight and resist less hard and so save allied 
lives and shorten the war, et cetera, etcetera. 
Undoubtedly, if this undertaking should prove 
successful it would be still more appealing. The 
other side is that no person knows how the 
proposal would work out. The militarists would 
try hard to interfere. Also should it fail the 
Japs would be encouraged while terrible political 
repercussions would follow in the U.S. Would it 
be well first to await the climax of allied 
bombing and Russia's entry into the war? 13 
Hull did not oppose giving the Japanese the assurance of 
retaining their Emperor. He did not believe that this 
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assurance would immediately make the Japanese lay down their 
arms. Certainly, the inclusion of the Emperor clause would 
cause more vehement discussion in the Japanese government 
and military circles than otherwise. What if "the climax of 
allied bombing" occurred while the Japanese were trying to 
reach their consensus. It would enrage not only 
militarists, but also make the peace-minded Japanese change 
their opinion about America. Hull might have heard that a 
new weapon would have enough power to destroy a city. In 
his memoir, Hull said that he had not been told by President 
Roosevelt about the bomb, but "Occasionally someone gave me 
a veiled hint." 14 Hull considered the possible Japanese 
response to the warning announcement and the atomic bombing 
more politically and realistically than Stimson did. This 
is also a question of how much and why the United Stated 
13 Ibid., volume II, 1267. 
14Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, 1,110. 
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needed to use the atomic bomb. If the Emperor clause had 
been included in the warning announcement, and the Japanese 
had been taking time to reach a decision for response, the 
time for the Soviet entry into the war came anyway. Was it 
advantageous from the American point of view? To Secretary 
of State Byrnes, the answer was "no", because he did not 
want the Soviets' ending the Japanese war. 
Stimson thought that if the Japanese were to persist 
after the warning announcement, the power of a new weapon 
would be imposed on Japan. 15 As to Stimson's proposition, 
if the Japanese had accepted the warning announcement with 
the assurance of the retention of the Imperial System, what 
would have happened to the United States plan to use the 
atomic bomb? Stimson said that the assurance of the dynasty 
"would make or mar their acceptance." 16 This statement 
indicates that if the Japanese were to accept the warning 
announcement with the Emperor clause, and the war were to 
come to its end without American use of the atomic bomb, 
Stimson thought that it was all right. Then, how about 
Stimson's previous idea that the American interests in East 
Asia vis-a-vis the Soviet Union was very much related to the 
efficacy of the atomic bomb. 17 Considering his conditions 
15A memo from Stimson to the President, in FRUS. The 
Conference of Berlin volume II, 1266. 
16Stimson Diaries, July 24, 1945. 
17Stimson Diaries, May 13, July 15, July 17, 1945. 
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might help to solve this question. According to his 
diaries, since he had such a serious health problem, his 
medical doctors regularly checked his health condition. He 
was surrounded by men of strong character, so he was likely 
to be influenced by what they said and what they did. Grew 
and Forrestal urged the inclusion of the Emperor clause in 
the warning announcement, and Byrnes decided for the 
deletion of the clause. 
The Japanese and the Potsdam Declaration 
Japanese Foreign Ministry officials received the 
broadcast of the Potsdam Declaration as something that would 
bring the war to its termination. They had heard Zacharias' 
broadcast time and time again, so they soon interpreted it 
to mean that the United States was not opposed to retaining 
the Japanese Emperor. This became the position of Foreign 
Minister Togo. However, at that time, Togo believed that 
the Japanese had to wait for the Soviet reply to the 
Japanese request of Soviet mediation in the war, and he 
stated this opinion in the cabinet meeting. 
On July 27, Tanemura recorded in the Staff Office diary 
two interpretations of the fact that the Soviet Union did 
not join the July 26th Potsdam Declaration: 
1. The Soviets did not join it because they would 
need Japan as a friendly nation to them in the 
worsening international situation. 
2. The Soviets would soon enter the war against 
Japan, and to keep it secret they did not join the 
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proclamation. 18 
Colonel Tanemura Sako wrote that since it was human nature 
to take the easy way, the officers at the Staff Office 
tended to think that Stalin was wise enough not to make 
Japan his enemy. Tanemura indicates that the Japanese were 
considerably concerned about the intention of the Soviet 
Union. 
On this day, Tanemura participated in the meeting of 
the secretaries for the Supreme War Council. They decided 
that they would just keep silent concerning the Potsdam 
Declaration. 19 "Keep silent" meant no answer to the Allies. 
Why did they decide to keep silent? There were several 
reasons: First, the opinions were divided among the Japanese 
over the interpretation of the Declaration, the main point 
of the controversy was whether the Allies intended to allow 
the Japanese to keep the Emperor. Second, the Soviet 
position was not clear, and Soviet officials promised the 
Ambassador to Moscow, Sato Naotake, that the Soviet 
government would answer to the Japanese request of mediation 
after Stalin and Molotov returned from Potsdam, and the 
Japanese government wanted to hear the Soviets' answer. 
Third, the Japanese feared that an open refusal would mean 
further American air raids and an invasion of the Japanese 
homeland as the warning announcement stipulated. 
18Tanemura, July 27, 1945. 
19 Ibid. 
Fourth, 
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any indication of willingness to accept the Declaration that 
proclaimed punishing Japanese militarists seemed to invite 
the danger that young Army officers might move for a coup 
d'etat. What is remarkable is that the Japanese government 
did not officially announce that the Japanese would oppose 
the Potsdam Declaration, though the United States government 
interpreted Prime Minister Suzuki's word 11 mokusatsu 11 , 
meaning "ignore", as the Japanese refusal to the 
Declaration. This interpretation became the American excuse 
to use the atomic bomb on Japan. However, the order to drop 
the bomb had already been issued from Potsdam on July 25, 
the day before the Potsdam Declaration, and as we saw 
before, the key figures in the American leadership had 
already expected that the Japanese would not immediately 
accept it. 
The Army Staff Off ice 
On July 30, at the Army Staff Office, in the 
conversation among the officers, Tanemura felt that they 
lost the morale to fight with Americans, and they expected 
the Soviet diplomatic effort to solve the issue for Japan. 
Tanemura got infuriated at their attitudes as army officers, 
and shouted, "Isn't your duty to find the way to winning the 
war? Don't depend on others." He wrote that he shuddered 
with a complaint that "The Army headquarters with such 
demoralized officers cannot lead the people to fighting on 
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the homeland. 1120 The next day, Tanemura was ordered to work 
at the Staff Office in Korea, and the diary ended on this 
day. 21 The note to the diary says that at the end of the 
war Tanemura became a prisoner to the Soviet Army. 22 
The Atomic Bombing and the Soviet Entry into the War 
The United States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima 
on August 6. After receiving the report of the news on 
August 7, Foreign Minister Togo met the Emperor and advised 
him to act to terminate the war. The Emperor said: 
... We could no longer continue the struggle, now 
that a weapon of this devastating power was used 
against us, we should not let slip the opportunity 
by engaging in attempts to gain more favorable 
conditions. 23 
However, no immediate meeting of the senior statesmen and 
military leaders for the occasion of emergency was held. It 
was on the morning of August 9, when the Soviet Union began 
to attack the Japanese forces in Manchuria, that the Emperor 
told Kido to consult with Prime Minister Suzuki and to take 
measures to bring the war to its end. 24 The question of 
which event gave more impact to the Japanese in their 
decision to end the war has been discussed. On August 12, 
20Tanemura, July 30. 
21Tanemura, July 31. 
22Tanemura, Diaries, 308. 
23Togo, The Cause of Japan, 315. 
24 Kido, August 9, 1945. 
1945, Navy Minister Yonai said to Takagi: 
Though I do not fear either the Atomic bombing or 
the Soviet entry into the war, these are the help 
of heaven to us, because now we can end the war 
without incurring domestic conflicts and 
disturbances. 25 
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When Konoe heard the news of the Soviet entry into the war, 
he said "This is the help of heaven." Yonai and Konoe 
thought that if the war continued, the internal disturbances 
were sure to develop. Even though on July 12, Konoe had 
received a mission from the Emperor to go to Moscow as a 
plenipotentiary to ask for Soviet mediation, in the first 
place, it was not his original wish, for he held strong 
anti-Soviet sentiment. Considering Japanese fear and 
anxiety about the Soviet entry into the war, it is certain 
that the Soviet entry into the war gave a considerable 
impact to the Japanese leaders. In June, Togo said that 
when the Soviets invaded Manchuria to enter the war with 
Japan, it was the time of the end of the Japanese Empire. 26 
The major obstacles for the Japanese effort to bring the war 
to its end were removed when the Soviet attack on the 
Japanese forces opened the way for direct negotiation with 
the United States. It is important to note that this 
alternative had already been considered much earlier in 
various sections in the Japanese government. The elusive 
wish of the Japanese Army and others to ask the Soviet 
25Yonai, Memoir, 153. 
26Togo, The Cause of Japan, 312. 
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mediation of the war finally crashed. 
One Condition or Four Conditions 
On August 9, in the Cabinet meeting and the Supreme War 
Council meeting for discussing the acceptance of the Potsdam 
Declaration, Foreign Minister Togo insisted on just asking 
the United States to let the Japanese keep the national 
polity, in other words, keep the Imperial System. The Army 
leaders, Anami and Umezu, insisted on adding three other 
terms: The Japanese disarm themselves; the Japanese try the 
Japanese war criminals, and that there would be no 
occupation of Japan by foreign Powers. The addition of 
these terms clearly contradicted the terms in the Potsdam 
Declaration, which stipulated that the Japanese militarists 
would be punished. So the Army leaders actually wanted to 
protect their organization, and others acquiesced. However, 
the opposition arose from outside these conferences. Prince 
Takamatsu, the Emperor's younger son, telephoned to Kido 
"fearing that the Allied powers might take our conditional 
acceptance as a refusal. " 27 Then, Shigemitsu Mamoru, 
Foreign Minister until April, 1945, visited Kido's office to 
tell him that "a rupture would be inevitable if we should 
lay down the four conditions." After Kido obtained the 
Emperor's approval, the Emperor told Prime Minister Suzuki 
to convene an Imperial Conference. From 11:50PM to 2:20AM, 
27Kido, August 9, 1945. 
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the Conference was held in the Emperor's presence. There, 
the Emperor presented his judgement to accept the Potsdam 
Declaration on the condition that the preservation of the 
Imperial dynasty and the right of sovereignty of the Emperor 
be acknowledged. 28 
The Emperor, Subject to the Supreme Commander 
On August 12, the Japanese government received the 
American reply that was written by Secretary of State James 
Byrnes. Paragraph 2, and paragraph 5, then became 
controversial within the government. 
From the moment of surrender, the authority of the 
Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the 
state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of 
the Allied powers, who will take such steps as he 
deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. 
The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in 
accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be 
established by the freely expressed will of the 
Japanese people. 29 
The Army leaders again opposed these terms interpreting the 
term "subject" as "enslaved". In the Army headquarters, 
these leaders were actually hearing vehement protests of 
young officers who opposed the Potsdam Declaration in the 
first place. These opponents asserted that the second 
paragraph denied the national polity of Japan. The 
democratic idea in this paragraph was quite foreign to the 
Japanese in those days, especially to the Army men, because 
28 Ibid. 
29Togo, The Cause of Japan, 324. 
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of the kind of education they received. 
Kido heard Prime Minister Suzuki begin to take a 
position that these two paragraphs would not guarantee the 
future status of the Emperor. Suzuki had a tendency since 
he took his office to cater to the demand of the Army men. 
He later claimed that by a posture of compromising with the 
Army, he tried to avoid its attempt of resorting to a coup 
d'etat. Also, since he was a survivor in the attempted 
assassination in the February 26th incident in 1936, he was 
considerably carefull in dealing with the Army men. In 
persuading Prime Minister Suzuki, Kido told Suzuki that: 
if we do not take an immediate action now to 
terminate the war, twenty million people will die. 
If we take a necessary action now, only several 
people will probably die; me, you, and a few 
others. 30 
Kido and Suzuki decided to use the Emperor's decision to 
accept the American terms. On the night of August 14-15, 
Kido was searched in the Imperial Palace by the Army rebels 
who rose to attempt a coup d'etat, and Suzuki's official 
residence and private home were assaulted and burned by 
other rebels. 
On August 14, the Emperor convened the Imperial 
Conference and he announced his decision to accept the 
American terms for the Japanese surrender on the ground that 
he was convinced of the United States' intention to keep the 
30Hando Kazutoshi, Nihon no Ichiban Nagai Hi. [Japan's 
Longest Day] (revised edition) (Tokyo: Bungeishunjusha, 
1995), 43; Shoda, History of Statesmen, 382. 
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Japanese Imperial System and he had confidence that the 
Japanese people would support the Emperor. On that evening, 
the Foreign Ministry officials sent the message of 
acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, and the next day, on 
August 15, the Emperor announced to the Japanese people by a 
radio broadcast that Japan would end the war. 
CONCLUSION 
In the summer of 1945, the Japanese no longer possessed 
strength to engage in a battle on the home land. The 
government and the military claimed that the Japanese would 
engage in a 100 million suicides war, if the Americans were 
to land on the Japanese homeland. However, this was 
propaganda without any substance. Many Japanese people were 
hungry and busy seeking food. The morale of the people was 
rapidly deteriorating mainly because of the devastating air 
raids. Though the Army claimed that it had two million 
troops in the home islands, there were only about 700,000 
rifles, and many actually would be requested to fight with 
bamboo spears. The Emperor mentioned that the war started 
because of oil, and the nation had to end the war because of 
the scarcity of oil. Though he simplified the situation, he 
pointed that Japan could not continue the war because of the 
scacity of materials. The loss of Japanese control of the 
sea and air increased American blockade of the Japanese 
homeland and contributed to the further scarcity of 
materials. 
The May 8th German surrender and the Japanese defeat at 
Okinawa in June showed the Japanese what it would be like if 
the United States armed forces landed on the Japanese 
mainland. Contrary to its previous pledge, many now 
believed that the Japanese military was unable to defend the 
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island and the people. Rather, even after the defeat in 
Okinawa became clear in early May, the Army kept fighting 
until June 23, thus becoming responsible for approximately 
150,000 civilian deaths. The Army lost its credibility. 
In the homeland of Japan, the army had already revealed its 
inability to defend the people against the American air 
raids, though they did not reveal their weakness so that 
they would not lose face. War Minister Anami's attempt to 
resign from his post because he was unable to def end the 
Imperial Palace from air raid signified the seriousness of 
the problem of air raids in general. The Emperor discovered 
that the previous Army Chief's report on defense conditions 
was false after sending his own military attendants to 
investigate the same areas. The investigation also revealed 
the dangerously low level of military strength of Japan at 
the time. 
The May 8th German defeat increased Japanese concern 
about possible Soviet entry into the war against Japan. 
The Army Chief's report on defense conditions in Manchuria 
stunned the Emperor. Men and arms had been drained from 
Manchuria to the Pacific, resulting from the severity of the 
Pacific War and the Japanese reliance on the Neutrality 
Treaty with the Soviet Union. If the Soviets were to invade 
Manchuria, it was feared by the Japanese that it would turn 
out to be a corridor for the Soviets' southern advance 
toward Japan. Diplomatic negotiation with the Soviet Union 
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to ask for continued Soviet neutrality and Soviet mediation 
in the Pacific War became an urgent task for the Japanese 
government. The Japanese government decided to ask the 
Soviets to abide by the treaty and mediate in the Pacific 
War. That was the major desire of the Army leaders. The 
Army and Navy leadership came to a point where many of them 
wanted to end the war by the time of the Japanese def eat in 
Okinawa. The Army leaders thought that in that way they 
could end the war without losing face. Others in the 
Japanese leadership acquiesced, thinking it to be the way to 
bring the Army to the road toward ending the war, though 
many of them had the alternative plan of asking for direct 
negotiation with the United States if the Soviet route was 
closed. 
The retention of the Japanese Emperor was a focal point 
for the United States and Japan in bringing the war to the 
end. The Japanese government proclaimed that the Japanese 
would fight to the end to achieve this objective, though 
they no longer had substantial will and power in the nation. 
Through these propaganda actions, the Japanese expected a 
political gain. In the early summer of 1945, some important 
figures in the American government began to think that it 
was advisable to end the war by allowing the Japanese to 
retain the Emperor. This matter finally materialized 
between the United States government and Japanese 
government. In the meantime, the United States dropped the 
atomic bomb on Hiroshima and the Soviet Union invaded 
Manchuria. 
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There are diverse opinions about how the Pacific War 
came to its end. To say that "The United States' dropping 
the atomic bomb ended the war," is too simplistic. This 
statement overlooks many other factors, especially the human 
factors, that contributed to the termination of the war. 
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